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1. Introduction:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Jacob	  Zuma	  Rape	  Trial	  	  	  ‘I	  haven’t	  spoken	  out	  before	  because	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  games	  that	  I	  saw	   being	   played	   in	   the	   media.	   I	   see	   myself	   being	   described	   and	   defined	   by	  others	   –	   the	   media,	   the	   defence,	   the	   Judge.	   I	   have	   seen	   the	   things	   said	   by	  members	  of	  the	  various	  structures	  and	  parties.	  I	  see	  analysis	  and	  judgment	  from	  all	  sides’	  (Odhiambo,	  2006).	  	  This	  quote	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  complainant	  in	  the	  Jacob	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  (hereafter	  ‘Zuma	  rape	  trial’)	  after	  the	  trial	  had	  concluded,	  in	  which	  Jacob	  Zuma,	  the	  Deputy	  President	  of	  South	  Africa,	  was	  being	  tried	  for	  an	  alleged	  rape	  of	  a	  family	  friend,	  known	  to	  the	  public	  by	  the	  pseudonym	  Khwezi,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  her	  identity.	  Rape	  charges	  were	  brought	  against	  Zuma	  in	  the	  South	  Johannesburg	  High	  Court	  on	  6	  December	  2005.	  Khwezi,	  the	  daughter	  of	  one	  of	  Zuma’s	  comrades	  in	  exile,	  alleged	  that	  whilst	  on	  an	  overnight	  visit	  to	  Zuma’s	  residence,	  Zuma	  had	  entered	  the	  room	  in	  which	  she	  was	  sleeping	  and	  had	  sexual	  intercourse	  despite	  her	  clear	  refusal	  of	  his	  advances	  on	  two	  occasions.	  According	  to	  Zuma,	  sexual	  intercourse	  was	   consensual,	   with	   Khwezi	   giving	   no	   verbal	   or	   physical	   indication	   of	   non-­‐consent	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  6).	  	  Given	   Jacob	  Zuma’s	  position	  within	   the	  government	  as	  Deputy	  President	  of	   the	  country	   and	   Deputy	   leader	   of	   the	   ruling	   party,	   the	   rape	   trial	   was	   one,	   which	  attracted	   huge	   public	   attention	   and	   evoked	   reactions	   from	   media,	   activists,	  academics,	   the	  public	  and	   factions	  within	   the	  African	  National	  Congress	   (ANC),	  both	  during	  and	  after	   the	   trial.	  Given	   the	  significant	  public	   interest	   in	   the	   trial,	  different	   issues	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   trial	  were	   highlighted	   by	   different	  interest	   groups.	   In	   particular,	   the	   Judge’s	   decision	   to	   allow	   evidence	   and	  testimony	  relating	  to	  the	  complainant’s	  past	  relationships	  and	  her	  sexuality	  were	  hotly	  debated.	  Zuma	  referred	  to	  the	  clothes	  the	  complainant	  was	  wearing	  on	  the	  evening	   of	   the	   incident,	   he	   referred	   to	   his	   interpretation	   of	   cultural	   beliefs	   to	  justify	  his	  actions	  and	  also	  raised	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  allegation	  as	  a	  political	  conspiracy	   to	   bring	   his	   character	   into	   disrepute.	   In	   this	   research	   report,	   my	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  presence,	  articulation	  and	  acceptance	  of	  rape	  myths	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within	  rape	  trials	  and	  the	  public	  discourse	  around	  rape	  trials.	  Although	  this	  issue	  seems	  to	  underlie	  many	  issues	  raised	  within	  the	  trial,	   it	   is	  yet	  to	  be	  the	  explicit	  and	   primary	   focus	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   trial.	   The	   issue	   of	   rape	  myths	   in	   the	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  area	  of	  focus	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  popular	  topics	  and	  discourses,	  however	  all	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  hotly	  debated	  topics	  can	   be	   understood	   and	   explained	   within	   the	   area	   of	   study	   focusing	   on	   rape	  myths	   in	  rape	   trials.	  Therefore,	   this	  study	  shows	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  arguments	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  public,	  the	  individuals	  involved	  in	  the	  trial	  itself	  and	  the	  media,	  were	  informed	  by,	  and	  thus	  reflections	  of,	  rape	  myths.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  said	  that	   in	   doing	   so,	   this	   study	   explains	   the	   way	   in	   which	   rape	  myths	   affect	   how	  societal	  and	  legal	  judgements	  relating	  to	  rape	  cases	  are	  made	  both	  within	  the	  law	  courts	  and	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  Examining	   the	   presence,	   articulation	   and	   acceptance	   of	   the	   rape	  myths	   in	   the	  Zuma	   rape	   trial	   discourse	   necessitates	   a	   study	   of	  material	   relating	   to	   the	   rape	  trial,	   including	  the	   judgement,	  as	  well	  as	   literature	   focusing	  on	  rape	  myths,	   the	  trial	   and	   media	   reports.	   This	   will	   allow	   for	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   various	  discourses,	   with	   particular	   focus	   in	   the	   role	   that	   rape	   myths	   play	   in	   these	  discourses,	  if	  at	  all.	  The	  nature	  of	  rape	  myths	  is	  such	  that	  they	  inform	  beliefs	  of	  individuals.	  These	  beliefs	   inform	  perceptions,	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  relating	  to	  rape.	  This	  means	  that	  understanding	  rape	  myths	  can	  often	  be	  a	  difficult	  task	  since	  perceptions	  and	  attitudes	  are	  mostly	  internal	  processes.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  also	   difficult	   to	   establish	   causality	   between	   certain	   behaviours	   and	   certain	  beliefs.	  One	  way	  to	  interpret	  and	  understand	  rape	  myths	  is	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	   a	   subject’s	   expression	   of	   internal	   and	   cognitive	   processes	   by	   their	   use	   of	  language	  and	  text,	  through	  which	  rape	  myths	  can	  be	  articulated	  (Van	  Dijk,	  2003).	  The	  process	  of	   analysis	   then	  necessarily	   requires	   the	  use	  of	  discourse	   analysis	  due	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   rape	   myths.	   I	   make	   particular	   use	   of	   feminist	   discourse	  analysis	   to	   explain	   and	   demonstrate	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   rape	  myths	   affect,	   and	  can	  be	  reflected	  in,	  societal	  and	  legal	  judgements	  relating	  to	  cases	  of	  rape.	  	  	  By	  means	  of	  discourse	  analysis,	   looking	  at	  media	  reports	  and	  the	   judgement	  of	  the	   Zuma	   rape	   trial,	   it	   can	   be	   shown	   that	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   a	   belief	   in,	   and	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articulation	   or	   presence	   of	   rape	  myths	   in	   the	   law	   and	   in	   rape	   cases	   ironically	  turns	   the	  presumption	  of	   innocence,	   specifically	   that	  of	   the	  complainant,	  on	   its	  head.	   This	   is	   achieved	   by	   means	   of	   the	   acceptance	   of	   arguments	   and	  justifications	  for	  rape	  that	  put	  the	  complainant	  on	  trial	  through	  the	  construction	  of	   the	   complainant	   as	   characteristically	   unreliable,	   morally	   blameworthy	   or	  simply	  ‘bad’,	  making	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  accused	  a	  secondary	  issue.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  perpetrator	  becomes	  the	  victim	  whose	  honour	  is,	  and	  must	  be,	   defended.	   Therefore,	   identity	   switching	   occurs,	   where	   the	   perpetrator	  becomes	   the	   victim	   and	   the	   victim	   becomes	   the	   perpetrator,	   who	   must	   be	  questioned.	   The	   switching	   of	   identity	   is	   done	   through	   the	   way	   in	   which	   rape	  trials	  are	  structured	  and	  processed,	  such	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  cross-­‐examination	  takes	  place	  and	  the	  evidence	  that	  is	  determined,	  by	  the	  judge,	  to	  be	  relevant	  for	  presentation	  within	  rape	  trials.	  	  	  I	  aim	  to	  achieve	  two	  objectives	  in	  this	  study.	  My	  primary	  aim	  is	  to	  unmask	  some	  of	   the	   underlying	   beliefs	   and	   assumptions	   embedded	   in	   the	   arguments	   put	  forward	  by	  the	  court	  and	  various	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  as	  well	  in	  individuals	   in	   the	   public	   domain,	   using	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   of	   feminist	  jurisprudence	  and	   feminist	  discourse	  analysis.	  This	   is	   informed	  by	  my	  concern	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  violence,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  rape,	  constructs	  and	  is	  constitutive	  of	  gender	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  marks	  the	  law	  and	  might	  prevent	  gender	  equality	  from	  being	  achieved.	   In	   achieving	  my	  primary	  aim,	   I	   seek	   to	  demonstrate	  how	  these	  arguments	  are	  founded	  on	  a	  subscription	  to,	  and	  acceptance	  of,	  rape	  myths	  that	  subsequently	  construct	  the	  complainant	  as	  responsible,	  in	  some	  way,	  for	  the	  alleged	  rape.	  This	  construction	  of	   the	  complainant	  as	  a	   suspect	  witness,	  whose	  claims	   should	   be	   approached	  with	   caution,	  means	   that	   the	   complainant	   has	   to	  prove	   her	   honour	   and	   veracity	   as	   reliable,	   moral	   and	   good.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   the	  dignity	   and	   independence	   of	   a	   complainant’s	   initial	   allegation	   is	   set	   aside	   in	  order	   to	   first	   consider	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   complainant.	   Having	   to	   prove	  credibility,	   honour	   and	   innocence	   becomes	   what	   the	   case	   is	   about.	   Thus,	   this	  research	  report	  will	  track	  the	  discourse	  are	  the	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  that	  was	  used	  in	  the	   arguments	   and	   cross-­‐examination	   by	   both	   defence	   attorneys,	   state	   the	  prosecutors,	   the	   complainant	   and	   accused,	   and	   the	   public.	   I	   conclude	   by	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illustrating	  that	  the	  pervasive	  nature	  of	  rape	  myth	  acceptance	  within	  a	  rape	  trial	  is	   problematic	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   it	   reconstructs	   the	   complainant	   because	   it	  worsens	  the	  traumatic	  experiences	  of	  victims2	  of	  rape.	  Therefore,	   if	  rape	  myths	  continue	   to	   be	   perpetuated	   in	   legal	   arguments,	   either	   by	   means	   of	   legal	  professionals	   or	   influential	   individual’s	   or	   institution’s	   responses	   to	   rape	  accusations,	  all	  complainants,	  even	  genuine	  complainants,	  will	  face	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  privacy	  being	  once	  again	  invaded	  and	  interrogated,	  in	  the	  service	  for	  a	  fair	  verdict,	  with	  little	  regard	  for	  the	  personal	  repercussions	  the	  complainant	  might	  face.	  This	   reality	  will	  not	  only	  dissuade	  women	   from	  reporting	  rape	   for	   fear	  of	  further	  trauma,	  it	  will	  also	  be	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	   justice	   system,	   which	   seeks	   to	   protect	   citizens	   and	   promote	   equality.	   An	  implication	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  is	  serves	  as	  one,	  amongst	  many,	  representations	  of	   the	   status	   of	   equality	   and	   equal	   treatment	   of	   rape	   complainant	   within	   the	  justice	   system.	   It	  may	   serve	   as	   an	   indicator	   to	   establish	  where	   further	  work	   is	  needed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  principles	  and	  practices	  guiding	  procedures	  within	  the	  justice	  system.	  	  
1. Background:	  South	  Africa	  -­‐	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Gender	  Equality	  	  1.1. Lived	  Experiences	  and	  the	  Law:	  Current,	  Contradictory	  Narratives	  	  Despite	  advancements	  in	  gender	  equality	  jurisprudence	  and	  within	  the	  sphere	  of	  politics,	  contradictory	  evidence	  exists	  regarding	  the	  daily	   lives	  of	  South	  African	  women.	   From	   the	   evidence	   of	   various	   advocacy	   groups,	   which	   statistics	   alone	  cannot	   show,	   the	   life	   of	   the	   ordinary	   woman	   as	   one	   of	   great	   vulnerability	   to	  violation	   and	   insecurity	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   norm.	   Acts	   of	   violence,	   such	   as	  domestic	  violence,	  family	  murders	  and	  suicides	  have	  become	  a	  recurrent	  feature	  in	   South	  African	  media,	   showing	   significant	   gender	  bias	  with	  most	   violent	   acts	  being	  perpetrated	  by	  men	  (Jewkes	  et.	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  South	  Africa	  Police	  Service	  (hereinafter	   the	   SAPS)	   reported	   that	   between	   April	   2013	   and	  March	   2014,	   62	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	   use	   the	  word	   victim	   rather	   than	   survivor	   (as	   is	   preferably	   used	   in	   feminist	  work	  regarding	  rape)	  with	  not	  intent	  to	  denote	  powerlessness.	  Instead,	  victim	  is	  used	  as	  it	  is	  most	  commonly	  used	  in	  criminology.	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649	  sexual	  offences	  were	  reported	  nationally.	  The	  report	  on	  crime	  statistics	  also	  showed	   that	   the	   rate	   of	   reported	   cases	   of	   sexual	   offence	   showed	   a	   downward	  trend	  from	  2004	  to	  2014,	  with	  69	  117	  reported	  cases	  of	  sexual	  offence	  in	  2004	  (SAPS,	  2014).	  66	  000	  rapes	  were	  reported	  between	  March	  2012	  and	  March	  2013	  and	  the	  National	  Prosecuting	  Authority	  has	  reported	  that	  rape	  cases	  constitute	  at	  least	   50	   percent	   of	   all	   cases	   brought	   before	   South	   African	   courts	   (September,	  2014a;	  Smith,	  2004).	  However,	  we	  are	  cautioned	  not	  to	  interpret	  these	  statistics	  as	  representative	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  sexual	  offences	  in	  South	  Africa	  for	  two	  reasons.	  One	  reason	   is	   that	   the	  South	  African	  police	  service	   is	  expected	  and	  mandate	   to	  reduce	  the	  levels	  of	  violent	  crime	  nationally,	  at	  a	  rate	  between	  ‘4%	  and	  7%	  per	  year’	   (Institute	   for	   Security	   Studies	   &	   Africa	   Check,	   2014).	   Therefore,	   a	  disincentive	   is	   created	   for	   the	   reporting	   and	   recording	   of	   all	   crimes	   reported.	  Instead	  police	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  encourage	  complainants	  to	  withdraw	  charges	  filed	   (South	  African	   Law	  Commission	   (SALC),	   2000:	   11).	   Secondly,	   the	  Medical	  Research	  Council	  estimates	  that	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  sexual	  offences,	  specifically	  rape,	   is	  much	  higher	   stressing	   the	  problem	  of	  underreporting	   in	   cases	  of	   rape.	  They	  argue	  that	  at	  most,	  one	  in	  nine	  rapes	  are	  reported,	  where	  some	  claim	  that	  only	  one	   in	  25	  women	  report	  rape	   to	  police,	  which	  renders	  official	  statistics	   in	  accurate	   and	   unreliable	   (Institute	   for	   Security	   Studies	   &	   Africa	   Check,	   2014;	  September,	   2014a;	   September	   &	   Essop,	   2014;	   Vetten,	   Jewkes,	   Sigsworth,	  Christofides,	  Loots	  &	  Dunseith,	  2008:	  16)	  	  Reasons	   that	  explain	  why	  many	  cases	  of	   rape	  are	  not	   reported	   to	   the	  police	   in	  South	   Africa	   include	   stigma,	   the	   fear	   of	   intimidation	   or	   humiliation,	   fear	   of	  further	  trauma,	  a	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  receiving	  a	  fair	  trial	  within	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	   feeling,	   and	   feeling	   partly	   to	   blame	   for	   the	   rape	   (Rape	   Crisis,	   2015;	  September,	   2014a;	   Jewkes	  &	  Abrahams,	   2002:	   1233).	   Having	   little	   faith	   in	   the	  abilities	  of	  the	  justice	  system	  to	  prosecute	  a	  rape	  case	  is	  not	  an	  irrational	  belief.	  In	  a	  survey	  study	  by	  Jewkes,	  Sikweyiya,	  Morrell	  and	  Dunkle	  (2010:	  25-­‐28),	  out	  of	  the	  25	  percent	  of	  men	  who	  admitted	  to	  having	  sexual	  intercourse	  with	  a	  women	  without	  her	   consent,	   a	   quarter	  had	  been	  arrested	   in	   connection	  with	   the	   rape,	  and	  half	  of	  those	  arrested	  were	  jailed,	  illustrating	  low	  conviction	  rates,	  with	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  reported	  cases	  of	  rape	  receiving	  guilty	  verdicts	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Artz	  &	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Smythe,	   2007:	   13;	   Pithey	   et.	   al.,	   1999:	   chapt.	   4,	   para.	   1).	   Additionally,	   once	   a	  perpetrator	   is	   found	   guilty,	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee	   that	   they	   will	   receive	   the	  minimum	   sentence	   or	   ten	   years.	   In	   fact,	   the	   study	   by	   Vetten	   et.	   al.	   (2008:	   54)	  shows	  how	   in	   the	   sample	   group	   that	  was	   tested,	   ’15,6%’	   of	   those	   found	   guilty	  received	   less	   than	   the	  minimum	  sentence.	  A	   study	   commissioned	  by	   the	  South	  African	  Medical	  Research	  Council	  (hereinafter	  the	  ‘MRC’)	  reported	  levels	  of	  rape	  and	   attempted	   rape	   as	   higher	   in	   the	   study	   than	   those	   reported	   by	   SAPS,	  supporting	  that	  claim	  that	  rape	  is	  an	  underreported	  phenomenon	  (Jewkes,	  Penn-­‐Kekana,	  Levin,	  Ratsaka	  &	  Schrieber,	  1999:	  18).	  Further	  studies,	   focusing	  on	  the	  attrition	  of	  rape	  cases	  through	  the	  justice	  system	  in	  Gauteng	  show	  that	  out	  of	  all	  reported	  cases	  of	  rape,	  half	  resulted	   in	  arrests,	  and	  half	  of	   those	  arrested	  were	  charged	   in	   court,	   with	   only	   4,1	   percent	   of	   all	   reported	   rapes	   resulting	   in	  convictions	  (Vetten	  et.	  al.,	  2008:	  8).	  	  The	  reality	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence	  results	  in	  the	  victimisation	  of	  women	  whose	  lives	   are	   threatened,	   as	   well	   as	   engendering	   of	   a	   psychology	   of	   fear	   of	  victimisation	  (Davis,	  2013).	  A	  case	  of	  rape,	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  South	  Africa,	  is	  perhaps	  most	  useful	  as	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pervasive	  forms	  of	  gender	  based	  violence	  that	  most	   severely	   impacts	   the	   everyday	   lives	   of	   South	   African	   women,	   especially	  rape	  victims.	  In	  2012,	  Interpol	  named	  South	  Africa	  the	  rape	  capital	  of	  the	  world	  with	  “500,000	  rapes	  a	  year;	  one	  every	  17	  seconds;	  one	  in	  every	  two	  women	  will	  be	   raped	   in	   her	   lifetime”	   (Strudwick,	   2014).	   	   Therefore,	   a	   case	   of	   rape	   is	  significant	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   presents,	   in	   stark	   terms,	   the	   lived	   experience	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  women.	  These	  statistics	  suggest	  that	  rape	  law	  reform,	  such	  as	  the	   broadening	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   rape	   as	   any	   kind	   of	   sexual	   violation,	   the	  establishment	  of	  Sexual	  Offences	  Courts	  and	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  marital	  rape,	  has	   not	   significantly	   curbed	   the	   perpetration	   of	   rape	   (SAHO,	   n.d.;	   Williams,	  2013).	  	  One	  way	   in	  which	   to	   interrogate	  what	   can	   often	   appear	   to	   be	   the	   unmediated	  perpetration	   of	   rape	   as	   well	   as	   the	   low	   levels	   of	   reporting,	   conviction	   and	  sentencing	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   justice	   system.	   This	   can	   be	   done	   through	   an	  examination	  of	  the	  law	  itself.	  	  In	  particular,	  one	  can	  examine	  the	  written	  law	  as	  it	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stands	   and	   its	   application	   and	   implementation	   by	   legal	   practitioners	   and	  theorists	  in	  order	  determine	  whether	  inconsistencies	  occur	  and,	  if	  so,	  where	  they	  occur.	  This	  kind	  of	  examination	  would	  require	   that	   the	   justice	  system	  be	  given	  more	  attention	  than	  it	  is	  usually	  given,	  since	  commonly-­‐held	  assumptions	  about	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  law	  tend	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  glossing	  over	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of,	  and	  practices	   within,	   the	   law.	   This	   view	   is	   articulated	   clearly	   by	   L’Heureux-­‐Dube	  (1997:	  335),	  who	  states	  that:	  inequality	  permeates	  some	  of	  our	  most	  cherished	  and	  long-­‐standing	  laws	  and	   institutions.	   Our	   obligation,	   therefore,	   is	   to	   reconsider	   our	  assumptions,	   re-­‐examine	  our	   institutions,	   and	   re-­‐visit	   our	   laws,	   keeping	  in	  mind	   the	   reality	   by	   those	  whom	   nature	   did	   not	   place	   in	   a	   dominant	  position.	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2. Methodology	  	  2.1. Limitations	  of	  the	  Study:	  Sampling	  	  I	   acknowledge	   that	   my	   choice	   of	   a	   single	   case	   study	   for	   my	   analysis	   has	  implications	   for	   the	   generalisability	   of	   my	   research	   findings.	   It	   may	   even	   be	  argued	   that	  my	   findings	  will	   apply	   only	   to	   the	   case	   at	   hand.	   The	   choice	   of	   the	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  was	  not	  a	  random	  choice.	  I	  took	  particular	  care	  in	  choosing	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  but	  mostly	  to	  ensure	  that	   the	   compromising	   generalisability	   could	   be	   substantiated	   by	   research	  outcomes	  that	  would	  make	  the	  trade-­‐off	  reasonable	  and	  justified.	  The	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  presented	  a	  special	  case	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   it	  was	  both	  a	  rape	   trial	  and	  one	  that	  was	  high	  profile.	  This	  meant	   that	   the	   trial	  had	  many	  of	   the	  characteristics	  and	   features	   of	   any	   other	   rape	   case,	   offering	   an	   opportunity	   to	   see	   whether	  assumptions	  about	  rape	  were	  reflected	  in	  the	  court	  proceedings	  and	  in	  discourse	  relating	  to	  a	  rape	  trial,	  such	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  cross-­‐examinations.	  Therefore,	  the	  Zuma	  rape	   trial	  was	  representative	  of	  rape	   trials	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   it	  presented	  and	  highlighted	  multiple	   issues	   relevant	  and	  prevalent	   in	  other	   rape	  cases	   too.	  Additionally,	   because	   the	   accusation	   was	   levelled	   at	   the	   Deputy	   President	   of	  South	   Africa,	   the	   trial	   received	   significant	   public	   interest	   and	  media	   coverage.	  Moreover,	   because	   of	   the	   high	   rank	   Zuma	   held	   in	   public	   office	   a	   decision	   to	  accuse	  him,	  then	  to	  indict	  him	  would	  not	  have	  been	  taken	  lightly,	  especially	  since	  the	  public	  and	  media	  maintained	  a	  watchful	  eye	  on	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  trial.	  	  	  2.2. Sources	  of	  Data	  	  I	  have	  two	  sources	  of	  data:	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  trial	  and	  various	  media	  reports	  regarding	  the	  trial.	  The	  judgement	  of	  the	  trial	  is	  significant	  in	  this	  study	  because	  it	  presents	  trial	  discourse,	  specifically	  the	  arguments	  presented	  by	  each	  party,	  as	  well	   as	   arguments	   presented	   by	   legal	   actors.	   These	   arguments	   are	   analysed	  through	  discourse	  analysis	  to	  reveal	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  arguments	  are	  meaning-­‐laden,	   even	   in	   highly	   mediated	   institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   justice	   system.	   Media	  reports	   are	   also	   referred	   to	   since	  media	   reports	   are	   representative	   of	   a	   larger	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group	  of	  society.	  Interviews	  conducted	  by	  the	  media,	  reporting	  of	  events	  by	  the	  media	  and	  the	  capturing	  of	  particular	  occurrences	  illustrate	  public	  discourse	  in	  a	  sphere	  that	  is	  less	  mediated	  than	  the	  court	  of	  law.	  Furthermore,	  since	  the	  media	  ‘became	  active	  players	  in	  the	  trial’	  (Reddy	  &	  Potgieter,	  2009:	  513),	  this	  discourse	  is	  significant	  in	  this	  analysis.	  	  	  2.3. Data	  Analysis:	  Conceptual	  and	  Theoretical	  Frameworks	  	  
2.3.1. Analytical	  Concepts:	  Rape	  Myths	  	  A	  myth	  can	  broadly	  be	  understood	  in	  two	  different	  ways	  (Dickinson,	  2011:	  335-­‐336).	   One	   way	   in	   which	   a	   myth	   can	   be	   understood	   is	   as	   a	   belief,	   which	   is	  incorrect	   because	   it	   can	  be	   empirically	  proven	   to	  be	   incorrect.	   	   Therefore,	   any	  behaviour	  informed	  by	  a	  belief	  in	  a	  myth	  is	  misguided.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  myth	  would	  be	  an	  AIDS	  myth.	  One	  such	  myth	  would	  be	  that	  ‘people	  who	  look	  healthy	   are	   safe	   to	   have	   sex	   with’	   (Dickinson,	   2001:	   339).	   Scientific	   research	  empirically	  proves	  that	  individuals	  that	  are	  infected	  with	  HIV	  can	  appear	  healthy	  for	   up	   to	   10	   years	   (Osmond,	   1998).	   Therefore,	   engaging	   in	   sexual	   intercourse	  with	   an	   individual	   who	   appears	   healthy,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   belief,	   would	   be	  misguided	   and	   potentially	   dangerous.	   Another	   way	   in	   which	   a	   myth	   can	   be	  understood	  is	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  what	  cannot	  be	  easily	  understood	  in	  reality.	  These	   myths	   cannot	   be	   necessarily	   considered	   true	   or	   false	   but	   must	   be	  understood	   as	   hypotheses.	   Such	  myths	  would	   act	   as	   underlying	   beliefs,	   which	  inform	  and	   support	   complimentary	   beliefs	   and	  behaviours.	   An	   example	   of	   this	  kind	  of	  myth	  would	  be	  the	  story	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  mankind	  as	  reflected	  in	  the	  Bible	  in	  Genesis.	  In	  the	  story	  of	  creation,	  Adam	  is	  created	  from	  soil	  and	  Eve’s	  origin	  is	  in	   Adam’s	   rib	   (Gen.	   2:3).	   	   The	   story	   of	   the	   Fall,	   which	   is	   the	   story	   of	   human	  obedience,	   tells	   how	  Eve,	   deceived	   by	   a	   snake	   in	   the	  Garden	   of	   Eden,	   ate	   fruit	  from	  the	  tree	  of	  knowledge	  which	  God	  had	  forbidden	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  to	  eat	  from	  (Gen.	  3).	  Eve	  then	  shared	  these	  fruit	  with	  Adam.	  Some	  religious	  interpretations	  of	  this	  story	  describe	  Eve	  as	  being	  at	  fault	  for	  enticing	  Adam	  to	  eat	  the	  fruit	  from	  the	   tree	   of	   knowledge,	   and	   therefore	   responsible	   for	   original	   sin.	   Such	   an	  interpretation	  is	  problematic	   in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	  constructs	  women	  and	  men	  in	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specific	   ways.	   Women	   are	   constructed	   as	   subservient	   to	   men,	   created	   as	  companions	  for	  men,	  that,	  although	  naïve	  and	  curious,	  have	  the	  power	  to	  entice	  innocent	  men	  who	  are	  incapable	  of	  resistance.	  Therefore,	  God’s	  punishment	  for	  women	   in	   the	   form	  of	   troublesome	  pregnancies	  and	  painful	   labour,	   is	  not	  only	  warranted,	  but	   is	   the	  direct	   result	  of	   the	  actions	  of	  Eve	   (Gen.	  3:16).	  Therefore,	  one	  can	  read	  the	  story	  of	  mankind	  as	  one	  that	  constructs	  women	  as	  wilful	  and	  blameworthy	  individuals	  in	  the	  circumstance	  they	  find	  themselves	  in.	  	  	  Rape	   myths	   can,	   in	   effect,	   be	   understood	   as	   beliefs	   about	   rape	   that	   form	   the	  function	  of	  explanation	  as	  well	  as	  beliefs	  that	  can	  be	  empirically	  disproven,	  with	  both	   kinds	   of	   beliefs	   amounting	   to	   an	   underlying	   belief	   that	   supports	   and	  justifies	  specific	  secondary	  beliefs	  and	  behaviours.	  Burt’s	  (1980:	  217)	  definition	  of	  rape	  myths,	  which	  is	  most	  commonly	  used,	  explains	  rape	  myths	  as	  ‘prejudicial,	  stereotyped	  or	  false	  beliefs	  about	  rape,	  rape	  victims	  and	  rapists’	  that	  consist	  of,	  and	   often	   result	   in,	   prejudiced	   judgments	   of	   victims	   (as	   vindictive),	   victim-­‐blaming	  (seeing	  rape	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  victim’s	  attire,	  or	  inebriation,	  or	  lack	  of	  a	  struggle),	  justifying	  the	  perpetrator’s	  acts,	  and	  minimising	  the	  traumatic	  effects	  of	  the	  rape.	  They	  can	  also	  be	  described	  as	  ‘culturally	  located	  attitudes	  and	  beliefs	  about	  rape’	  (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	  2008:	  9)	  that	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  empirical	  evidence.	   	  Examples	  of	  how	  rape	  myths	  are	  articulated	  are	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.3.2.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  rape	  myths	  is	  contested	  and	  has	  not	  been	  wholly	  accepted.	  Helen	  Reece	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  rape	  myths	  are	  not	  as	  pervasive	  as	  argued	  in	  feminist	  literature,	   nor	   should	   all	   of	   interpretations	   and	   justifications	   of	   rape	   be	  considered	   rape	   myths,	   as	   suggested	   by	   feminist	   researchers.	   Instead,	   Reece	  (2008:	  446)	  suggests,	  research	  overstates	  the	  nature	  and	  pervasiveness	  of	  rape	  myths	   creating	   ‘myths	   about	  myths’.	   In	   rebuttal,	   Conaghan	   and	  Russell	   (2014)	  argue	   that	   because	  Reece’s	   thesis	   approaches	   the	  notion	  of	   rape	  myths	   from	  a	  narrow	  perspective,	   it	   fails	   to	   engage	  with,	   and	   address,	   feminist	   literature	   on	  rape	  myths.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  contest	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  rape	  myths	  is	  reductionist,	  unlike	   the	   theoretical	   frameworks	   of	   feminist	   jurisprudence	   and	   feminist	  discourse	  analysis,	  which	  first	  proposed	  the	  notion.	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2.3.2. Theoretical	  Framework:	  Feminism	  –	  The	  Fight	  for	  Gender	  Equality	  	  The	  fight	  for	  gender	  equality	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  finding	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  struggles	  for	  equality	  beginning	  with	  the	  suffragette	  movement	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  predominantly	   in	   Western	   countries	   (DuBois,	   1975;	   DuBois,	   1987;	   Smith-­‐Rosenberg,	  1971:	  584).	  This	  movement	  sought	  to	  ensure	  that	  women	  were	  given	  the	   right	   to	   vote	   in	   elections	   and	   participate	   actively	   in	   democracies	   by	   being	  able	   to	   hold	   public	   office	   (Stanton,	   1889:	   22,58;	   Jacobi,	   1894:	   138).	   This	  movement,	   commonly	   known	   as	   the	   first	   wave	   of	   the	   women’s	   liberation	  movement,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  embodying	  much	  of	  the	  early	  feminist	  thought	  and	  as	  informing	  ‘modern’3	  feminism	  (Taylor,	  1989;	  Mill	  1989:	  123;	  De	  Beauvoir,	  1997).	   	   Feminism	   can	   be	   characterised,	   and	   therefore	   defined	   by,	   its	   aims,	   of	  which	   there	   are	   two.	   First,	   feminist	   approaches	   are	   united	  by	   their	   concern	   to	  ‘bring	   an	   end	   to	   sexism	   in	   all	   its	   forms’	   (Hartsock,	   1998:	   15).	   And	   secondly,	  feminism	   always	   seeks	   to	   confront	   male	   power	   and	   domination	   in	   all	   its	  dimensions.	  In	  other	  words,	  feminism	  focuses	  on	  the	  past	  and	  present	  forms	  of	  discrimination	  and	  exploitation	  of	  women,	  which	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  relations	  of	  power	  that	  establish	  men’s	  and	  women’s	  roles.	  	  	  Gender	   is	   a	   relational	   concept	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   contextually	   defined	   and	  understood.	   Feminist	   thought	   is	   normative	   in	   its	   objective	   to	   explain	   relations	  between	   men	   and	   women	   as	   a	   relation	   of	   power,	   where	   the	   male	   subject	   is	  usually,	  but	  not	  always,	  empowered	  and	  the	  female	  subject,	  disempowered.	  In	  its	  various	  forms,	  feminism,	  and	  especially	  feminist	   jurisprudence,	   is	  committed	  to	  addressing	   all	   forms	   of	   injustice	   (Fineman,	   2005:	   14).	   The	  women’s	   liberation	  movement	   formed	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   theory	   that	   not	   only	  explained	   women’s	   secondary	   status,	   but	   also	   called	   for	   equality	   of	   men	   and	  women.	  Not	   a	   unified	  movement,	   feminist	   activism	   of	   all	   sorts,	   has	   fought	   for,	  and	  won,	  many	  battles	  regarding	  the	  inequality	  of	  women	  as	  rightful	  citizens	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	   word	   ‘modern’	   is	   used	   temporally,	   and	   loosely,	   to	   refer	   to	   feminism	   of	  today	  in	  all	  its	  variants,	  and	  makes	  reference	  to	  no	  particular	  strand	  of	  feminism.	  I	   also	   do	   not	   suggest	   that	   the	   feminism	   of	   today	   is	   distinctly	   different	   from	  feminist	  thought	  that	  came	  before	  it.	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their	  countries,	  most	  notably	  winning	  the	  right	  to	  vote.	  But	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  feminism	   from	  the	  1970s	  onwards,	  had	   identified	   the	   limits	   to	   formal	  equality,	  showing	  that	  subordination	  and	  oppression	  of	  women	  was	  based	  on	  deep	  social	  structures	  within	  all	  cultures.	  Thus,	  the	  feminist	  critique	  can	  be	  described	  as	  the	  particular	   study	   and	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   social,	   political,	   economic	   and	   cultural	  intersections	  where	   gender	  plays	   a	  determinate	   role	   in	   the	  way	   its	   actors	   live,	  and	  are	  capable	  of,	  living	  their	  lives.	  	  	  2.3.2.1. Feminist	  Discourse	  Analysis	  	  One	   such	   intersection,	   as	   illustrated	   above,	   is	   the	   intersection	   between	   gender	  and	  discourse.	   	  This	  is	  known	  as	  feminist	  discourse	  analysis.	  Discourse	  analysis	  is	  a	  method	  that	  emphasises	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  language	  as	  reproducing	  and	  enacting	  “social	  power,	  abuse,	  dominance	  and	  inequality”	  (Van	  Dijk,	   2003:	   352;	   Sankar	   &	   Govindaraju,	   2014;	   Wodak	   &	   Meyer,	   2009:	   5;	  Cresswell,	  2007).	  Therefore,	   language	  and	   linguistics	  are	   central	   to	   its	  method.	  Defined	   as	   the	   study	   of	   language	   and	   meaning,	   discourse	   analysis	   seeks	   to	  uncover	   and	  understand	   language	  not	   only	  by	  means	  of	   studying	   linguistics	   in	  isolation,	  but	  by	  studying	  language	  in	  the	  ‘context	  of	  interpretation	  and	  culture’	  (Frohmann	   &	   Mertz,	   1994:	   846).	   An	   emphasis	   on	   language	   within	   specific	  contexts	  acknowledges	   the	  social	  nature	  of	   language	  as	  a	  practice.	  This	  view	   is	  reiterated	   by	   Erving	   Goffman’s	   theory	   of	   interpretation,	   as	   summarised	   by	  Martin	  and	  Powell	  (1994:	  859).	  In	  this	  theory,	  the	  context	  within	  which	  language	  exists	   is	   defined	   as	   being	   constituted	   by	   socially	   constructed	   frameworks	   that	  govern	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   behaviour	   and	   how	   situations	   are	   perceived.	   In	  other	  words,	   contexts	   involve	   socially	   constructed	   frameworks	   that	   affect	   how	  individuals	  perceive	  and	  interpret	  events,	  thereby	  affecting	  individual	  responses	  to	  events.	  	  	  Therefore,	  understanding	  language	  and	  its	  use	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  context	   within	   which	   words	   are	   uttered	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   appropriate	  understanding.	   It	   is	   the	   context	   than	   informs	   vocabulary	   used	   within	   social	  interaction.	  Feminist	  discourse	  analysis	  emphasises	  and	  chooses	  the	  perspective	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of	  gender	  to	  show	  how	  power,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  patriarchy	  and	  male	  dominion	  over	  women,	  permeates	  linguistic	  structures	  within	  society.	  By	  doing	  so	  male	  power	  is	   maintained	   through	   language	   and	   power	   relations	   between	   dominant	   and	  subordinate	  groups	  are	  produced	  (Frohmann	  &	  Mertz,	  1994:	  833).	  	  It	  is	  through	  language	   that	   individuals	   can	   participate	   in	   ‘legitimizing	   or	   challenging,	  supporting	   or	   ironizing,	   endorsing	   or	   subverting’	   (Parker,	   1997:	   290)	   social	  action,	   conceptions	   of	   the	   self	   and	   normative	   behaviour	   and	   practices.	   A	  patriarchal	   language	   gives	   privilege	   to	   the	   male	   voice	   over	   female	   voices	  politically	   and	   socially,	   enabling	  male	   voices	   and	   speech	   acts	   the	   capacity	   and	  ability	   to	   denunciate	   women.	   This	   denunciation	   can,	   and	   often	   does,	   directly	  inhibit	   the	   right	   and	   choices	   of	   women	   through	   words	   (Ratele,	   2006:	   56).	  Therefore,	   when	   analysing	   the	   discourse	   of	   legal	   language,	   feminist	   discourse	  analysis	  recognises	   language	  as	  a	   form	  of	  domination	  through	   ‘courtroom	  talk’,	  in	  rape	  trials,	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  reproduces	  the	  act	  of	  rape,	  constructing	  the	   rape	   victim’s	   ‘moral	   character	   in	   a	  way	   that	   holds	   her	   responsible	   for	   the	  rape	  incident’	  (Roberts,	  1994:	  462).	  	  	  In	   this	   research,	   I	   use	   the	  method	   of	   feminist	   discourse	   analysis	   rather	   than	   a	  quantitative	   methodology	   because	   rape	   myths	   speak	   to	   cognition	   and	  psychology,	  an	  analysis	  of	  rape	  myths	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  myths	  are	  exhibited.	  Rape	  myths	  are	  most	  evidently	  exhibited	  in	  the	  articulation	  of	  thoughts,	  and	  therefore	  words.	  Identification	  of	  rape	  myths,	  therefore,	  do	  not	  lend	   themselves	   to	   quantitative	   analysis,	   except	   in	   the	   case	   of	   calculating	   the	  extent	  of	  rape	  myth	  acceptance,	  which	  is	  not	  of	  concern	  to	  this	  research	  project.	  Moreover,	  a	  quantitative	  approach	  cannot	  capture	  the	  fullness	  and	  meanings	  of	  human	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  in	  numbers	  (Monette,	  Sullivan	  &	  DeJong	  2011:	  92).	  	  Another	   reason	  making	   a	   qualitative	  methodology	   preferable	   to	   a	   quantitative	  methodology	  is	  that	  there	  is	  sufficient	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  rape	  myths,	  providing	  a	  good	  foundation	  for	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  research	  topic	  that	  is	  not	   only	  workable,	   but	   also	  worthwhile.	   Additionally,	   because	   I	  want	   to	   locate	  my	   main	   study	   of	   rape	   myths	   by	   providing	   a	   contextual	   study,	   a	   qualitative	  methodology	   will	   enable	   the	   interpretation	   and	   representation	   of	   narratives,	  perspectives	   and	   meanings	   of	   the	   broader	   social	   dialogue.	   Since	   I	   can	   only	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analyse	   rape	   myths	   in	   their	   articulation	   though	   language,	   I	   am	   limited	   to	   the	  method	  of	  discourse	  analysis.	  Although	  I	  do	  acknowledge	  that	  gender	  biases	  can	  be	  exhibited	  physically,	  rape	  myths	  (although	  a	  particular	   form	  of	  gender	  bias)	  are	   central	   to	   my	   study	   and	   cannot	   be	   assessed	   through	   observations	   of	  behaviours,	   which	   is	   why	   I	   will	   not	   be	   using	   ethnographical	   analysis	   in	   my	  research.	  	  2.3.2.2. Feminist	  Jurisprudence	  	  	  Another	   intersection	   where	   gender	   plays	   a	   determinate	   role	   is	   that	   between	  gender	   and	   the	   law.	   	   The	   study	   and	   critique	   of	   this	   intersection	   is	   known	   as	  feminist	   legal	   theory	   or	   feminist	   jurisprudence.	   Feminist	   jurisprudence	  interrogates	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   law,	   along	  with	   its	   various	   actors,	   being	   a	   gender-­‐neutral,	   unbiased	   executer	   and	   distributor	   of	   justice.	   (Gilligan,	   1982:	   6-­‐9).	  Specifically,	  feminist	  jurisprudence	  reveals	  ‘how	  the	  structure	  of	  legal	  discourse	  and	  legal	  rules	  implicate	  power;	  making	  visible	  how	  legal	  ideology	  and	  discourse	  exclude	   the	   voices	   of	  women’	   (Frohmann	  &	  Mertz,	   1994:	  844)	  The	   research	   is	  undertaken	  using	  this	  theoretical	  framework.	  	  	  Feminist	   jurisprudence	   has	   become	   prominent	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   revealing	   and	  questioning	   how	   certain	   laws	   and	   legal	   procedures	   point	   to	   underlying	   beliefs	  and	  assumptions	  about	  gender	  that	  may	  be	  detrimental	  to	  women.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  subordination	  of	  women	  in	  the	  law	  can	  be	  said	  to	  generally	  take	  two	  forms,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  roots	  in	  the	  experiences	  of	  women	  and	  the	  law.	  First,	  feminist	  legal	   theorists	   are	   interested	   in	   legal	   reform,	   “using	   law	   to	   attain	   gender	  equality”	  (Fineman,	  2005:	  15-­‐16;	  Du	  Toit,	  2012)	  by	  confronting	  legal	  institutions	  that	  uphold	  discriminatory	  laws.	  This	  approach	  has	  resulted	  in	  many	  successful	  reforms	  such	  as	  reproductive	  rights,	  the	  extension	  of	  property	  rights	  to	  women,	  better	  treatment	  and	  more	  equitable	  remuneration	  of	  women	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	   substantial	   legal	   reforms	   in	   the	   understanding	   and	   treatment	   of	   gender-­‐based	   violence	   and	   domestic	   violence	   (Fineman,	   2005:	   18).	   The	   second	   form	  feminist	   legal	   theory	  can	  take	   is	  one	  whose	  central	   interest	   is	  methodology.	  An	  analysis	  of	  legal	  method	  involves	  descriptive	  and	  normative	  claims	  regarding	  the	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‘the	   “doing”	   of	   law’	   (Bartlett,	   1990:	   830).	   Bartlett	   (1990:	   830)	   understands	  feminist	   critique	   of	   methodology	   as	   significant	   because	   one’s	   view	   of	  methodology	  delimits	  what	  practical	   and	   legal	   reforms	  are	  viable.	   It	   is	  method	  that	  ‘organizes	  the	  apprehension	  of	  truth;	  it	  determines	  what	  counts	  as	  evidence	  and	  defines	  what	   is	   taken	  as	  verification’	  (MacKinnon,	  1983:	  527).	  The	  rules	  of	  method	   prescribe	   how	   the	   law	   is	   to	   be	   used	   and	   made	   to	   work	   as	   a	   whole.	  Moreover,	   in	   defining	   the	   law,	   method	   can	   ultimately	   continue	   to	   perpetuate	  seen	  and	  unseen	   ‘power	  structures’	  (Singer,	  1989)	  that	  prove	  to	  be	   illegitimate	  and	  discriminatory.	  	  	  Both	   forms	   of	   feminist	   legal	   theory	   tackle	   and	   challenge	   perceptions	   and	  assumptions	   that	   the	   law,	   along	   with	   its	   constitutive	   processes,	   is	   gender-­‐neutral,	   objective	  and	   fundamentally	   just	   in	   its	  nature	  and	  structure	   (Fineman,	  2005:	  14,17;	  Bartlett,	  1990:	  829;	  Littleton,	  1987:	  1044;	  Wikler,	  1981:	  203).	  For	  Bartlett	   (1990:	  845),	  an	  analysis	  of	   legal	  methods	   is	  paramount	   in	  determining	  ‘hidden	  biases’	  within	   the	   law.	  The	   feminist	  method	  of	   inquiry,	  which	   sees	   the	  unequal	   social	   status	   of	   women	   as	   central	   to	   its	   question,	   thus	   makes	   it	   a	  requirement	   to	   ‘search	   gender	   bias…	   [and]	   disadvantage	   based	   upon	   gender’	  (Bartlett,	   1990:	   846)	   within	   the	   justice	   system	   both	   substantively	   and	  procedurally.	  	  2.3.2.3. Feminist	  Conceptions	  of	  Rape:	  Rape	  as	  a	  Patriarchal	  Instrument	  	  Recognising	  the	  male-­‐centredness	  in	  language,	  which	  often	  results	  in	  definitions	  that	  mask	  male	   dominance,	   feminism	   seeks	   to	   redefine	   social	   phenomena	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   eliminates	   misogyny	   and	   sexism.	   Heteronormative,	   androcentric	  patriarchal	   values	   influence	   social	   norms	   and	   beliefs	   that	   result	   in	   the	  understanding	  of	  particular	  phenomena	  in	  specific	  ways.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  rape,	  the	  assumption	   of	   heterosexuality	   and	   opposite	   and	   complimentary	   gender	  identities	   and	   roles	   transforms	   ‘rape	   into	   “sex”	   and	   not	   criminal	   conduct’	  (Henderson,	  1993:	  42).	  This	  definition	  of	  sex	  in	  male,	  and	  therefore	  sexist,	  terms	  makes	  no	  distinction	  between	  rape	  and	  sex,	  diminishing	  the	  power	  of	  women	  to	  make	  choices	  (Martin	  &	  Powell,	  1994:	  856).	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  Rape	   is	   a	   crime	   that	   shows	   strong	   gender	   biases	   that	   are	   reflected	   in	   rape	  statistics	  (StatsSA,	  2000:	  2;	  Henderson,	  1993:	  71;	  Du	  Toit,	  2012:	  467).	  	  As	  such,	  the	  general	  conception	  of	  rape	  is	  characterised	  by	  male	  perpetration	  of	  the	  rape	  act	  upon	  a	  female	  victim.	  It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  ‘rape	  is	  a	  man’s	  act…	  and	  being	  raped	  is	  a	  woman’s	  experience’	  (Feild,	  1978:	  157).	  The	  reality	  of	  the	  gendered	  nature	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  rape	  is	  clearly	  illustrated	  in	  the	  fear	  of	  rape,	  which	  is	  most	  common	  in	   women.	   This	   ‘distinctly	   female	   fear’	   (Bublick,	   1999:	   1456)	   of	   rape	   is	  understood,	   in	   feminist	   theories	   of	   rape,	   as	   a	   mechanism	   to	   maintain	   male	  domination	  over	  women.	  In	  fearing	  rape,	  women	  begin	  to	  live	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  reflects	  a	  fear	  of	  falling	  victim	  to	  what	  can	  sometimes	  be	  perceived	  by	  women	  as	  the	   inescapable	  violence	  of	  rape.	  As	  such,	  women	  often	  shape	  their	  conduct,	  or	  are	  socialised	  to	  shape	  their	  conduct,	  in	  a	  manner,	  which	  reflects	  this	  fear	  despite	  their	  being	  no	  objective	  or	  legal	  requirement	  to	  behave	  in	  this	  particular	  manner	  (Bublick,	  1999:	  1413;	  Du	  Toit,	  2012:	  470).	  Therefore,	  women	  often	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  limit	  engagement	  in	  particular	  socio-­‐economic	  spheres	  and	  activities,	  such	  as	  working	  in	  a	  condition	  deemed	  unsafe	  since	  it	  requires	  work	  at	  night	  or	  walking	  alone,	   thereby	   restricting	   their	   freedom	   of	   movement	   (Bublick,	   1999:	   1458;	  Pithey,	  Artz,	   Combrinck	  &	  Naylor,	   1999:	   1).	   This	   places	   limits	   on	   the	   extent	   of	  participation	   and	   level	   of	   engagement	   by	   women	   within	   the	   society	   and	  economy,	  especially	  in	  the	  spheres	  of	  the	  workplace	  and	  social	  activities.	  It	  also	  increases	  women’s	  dependence	  on	  men	  significantly,	  limiting	  ‘individual	  agency	  and	  choice’	  (Gavey,	  2005:	  71).	  There	  is	  substantial	  agreement	  that	  the	  fear	  and	  act	  of	  rape	  can	  subsequently	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  patriarchal	  mechanism	  for	  the	  subjugation	  and	  repression	  of	  women	  that	  acts	   to	  socially	  control	  and	  regulate	  significant	   and	   meaningful	   aspects	   of	   the	   lives	   of	   women	   (Rozée,	   1993:	   512;	  Donat	  &	  D’Emilio,	  1992:	  15;	  Bublick,	  1999:	  1456;	  Feild,	  1978:	  157,174;	  Torrey,	  1990:	   1071).	  Maintaining	   the	   patriarchal	   hierarchy	   of	  male	   power	   and	   control	  over	  women	  by	  means	  of	  the	  act	  of	  rape	  or	  the	  female	  fear	  of	  rape,	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  assertion	   that	  women	  must	  either	   ‘behave,	  or	  be	  raped’	   (Donat	  &	  D’Emilio,	  1992:	  14).	  By	  conceptualising	  rape	  in	  terms	  of	  power,	  feminist	  theory	  politicised	  rape	   where	   it	   had	   previously	   been	   understood	   as	   a	   sexual	   act.	   In	   doing	   so,	  feminist	   theory	   turned	   rape	   from	   a	   sexual	   act,	   in	   male	   terms,	   to	   an	   ‘act	   of	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violence’	  (MacKinnon,	  1983:	  646;	  Butler,	  1994:	  7)	  and	  power	  serving	  to	  support	  a	  system	  of	  patriarchy.	  	  	  2.4. Confidentiality,	  Ethics	  and	  Access	  	  Much	   of	   the	   information	   regarding	   the	   Zuma	   rape	   case	   is	   public	   knowledge.	  Individuals	  involved	  in	  the	  case,	  specifically	  the	  Judge	  and	  Jacob	  Zuma	  both	  hold	  public	  office.	  The	   judgement	  of	  the	  trial	   is	  available	  to	  the	  public	  electronically,	  making	   the	   judgement	   accessible.	   Laws	   governing	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  complainant’s	   identity	   state	   that	   the	   name	   and	   surname	   of	   the	   complainant	  cannot	   be	   known.	   However,	   during	   the	   course	   of	   the	   trial,	   the	   identity	   of	   the	  complainant	   became	   public	   knowledge.	   Even	   though	   using	   the	   complainant’s	  name	  and	  surname	  in	  this	  report	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  of	  confidentiality,	  I	  will	  be	  using	  the	   pseudonym,	   Khwezi,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ethical	   consideration	   for	   rape	  complainants.	   Therefore,	   I	   present	   the	   defendant	   as	   she	   is	   presented	   in	   the	  transcripts.	   No	   permission	   is	   needed.	   Media	   reports	   are	   also	   available	   to	   the	  public.	   	   I	   use	   these	   references	   as	   they	   are	   represented	   to	   the	   public,	   thereby	  protecting	  confidentiality.	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3. Feminist	  Jurisprudence	  	  Mackinnon	  describes	  feminism	  (1983:	  635)	  as	  a	  ‘theory	  of	  power’	  that	  uncovers	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  hegemonic,	  androcentric	  perspective	  systematically	  dictates	  social	   realities,	   especially	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   gender	   identities,	   with	   the	   aim	   of	  validating	   disempowering	   experiences	   women	   have	   under	   male	   power.	  MacKinnon	   (1983:	   644)	   proposes	   that	   the	   ‘state	   is	   male	   in	   a	   feminist	   sense’.	  Therefore,	   she	   sees	   state	   institutions,	   society	   and	   the	   law	   as	   reflecting	  androcentric	   values	   such	   as	   the	   legitimisation	   and	  enforcement	  of	  male	  power	  and	  control	  of	  feminine	  bodies.	  These	  values	  are	  reinforced	  in	  policies	  that	  guide	  individual	  and	  institutional	  behaviour	  in	  society	  such	  as	  state	  policy	  and	  the	  law.	  Therefore,	   it	   can	   be	   said	   that,	   in	   doing	   so,	   male	   power	   and	   privilege	   are	  institutionalised.	  All	  definitions,	  both	  social	  and	  legal,	  are	  defined	  and	  articulated	  in	  male	  terms	  (Henderson,	  1993:	  42).	  This	  becomes	  particularly	  problematic	  in	  social	  and	  legal	   issues	  that	  show	  strong	  gender	  biases,	  such	  as	  instances	  where	  the	   law	   defines	   and	   interprets	   rape	   in	   an	   androcentric	   manner,	   whilst	  individuals	   socialised	  within	   a	  male	   state	   enact	   sexist	   norms.	   Founded	   on	   the	  same	   principle,	   feminist	   jurisprudence	   seeks	   to	   address	   issues	   pertaining	   to	  women’s	   everyday	   experiences	   as	   well	   as	   how	   society	   and	   the	   state	   seek	   to	  address	  these	  issues,	  with	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  law.	  	  3.1. Feminist	  Critique	  of	  Methodology:	  Bias	  Within	  the	  Justice	  System	  	  The	   supposed	   neutrality	   of	   the	   law	   is	   questioned	   by	   feminist	   jurisprudence,	  uncovering	  gender	  biases	  within	  legislation	  and	  in	  legal	  process	  and	  procedure.	  Feminist	   critique	   of	   legal	   method,	   in	   particular,	   has	   brought	   to	   light	  discrimination	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   gender	   within	   the	   law.	   Scholars	   have	   since	  criticised	   the	   legal	   system	   for	   being	   fundamentally	   biased	   against	   women	  making	   particular	   reference	   to	   its	   androcentric	   and	   male-­‐dominated	   nature	  (Frenkel,	   2008:	   4).	   Numerous	   empirical	   studies	   have	   supported	   this	   claim	   by	  showing	  how	  the	  written	   law	  and	   the	   law	   in	  practice	   is	   riddled	  with	  overt	  and	  subtle	  forms	  of	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender.	  One	  area	  in	  which	  feminist	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jurisprudence	  has	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  both	  in	  reform	  and	  research	  is	  in	  the	  case	  of	  rape,	  particularly	  rape	  trials.	  	  	  3.2. Rape	  Law	  Reform	  and	  its	  Limits	  
	  Rape	  law	  reform	  in	  South	  Africa	  has	  been	  driven	  by	  feminist	  critique,	  which	  has	  achieved	   success	   in	   reforming	   certain	   parts	   of	   the	   law	   concerned	   with	   rape,	  especially	  in	  areas	  concerning	  ‘definition,	  evidence	  and	  procedure’	  (Van	  der	  Bijl	  &	   Rumney,	   2009:	   414).	   There	   has	   been	   widespread	   recognition	   of	   the	   broad	  nature	   of	   rape	   as	   a	   coercive	   sexual	   violation,	   the	   problems	   associated	   with	  evidence	  in	  rape	  cases,	  and	  how	  procedures	  work	  to	  promote	  or	  diminish	  justice.	  In	   South	   Africa,	   substantive	   reform	   is	   embodied	   in	   the	   Criminal	   Law	   (Sexual	  Offences	  and	  Related	  Matters)	  Amendment	  Act	  32	  of	  2007	  (hereinafter	  the	  ‘2007	  Act’).	   	   	  Within	  the	  2007	  Act,	  the	  definition	  of	  rape	  has	  been	  broadened.	  Initially	  defined	  as	  penal	  penetration	  of	   the	  vagina	  without	   consent,	   rape	  now	   includes	  coercive	  sexual	  penetration	  without	  consent,	  integrating	  notions	  of	  consent	  and	  coercion	   (Van	   der	   Bijl	   &	   Rumney,	   2009:	   417).	   The	   law	   as	   it	   stands,	   in	   South	  Africa,	  defines	  rape	  as:	  any	   person	   (‘A’)	   who	   unlawfully	   and	   intentionally	   commits	   an	   act	   of	  sexual	  penetration	  with	  a	  complainant	   (‘B’),	  without	   the	  consent	  of	  B,	   is	  guilty	  of	  the	  offence	  of	  rape’	  (Criminal	  Law	  (Sexual	  Offences	  and	  Related	  Matters)	  Amendment	  Act	  32,	  2007:	  11).	  	  This	   redefinition	  of	   rape	   served	   to	   reflect	   a	  more	   inclusive	   legal	   framework.	   It	  also	  recognised	  the	  criminality	  of	  marital	  rape	  which	  in	  many	  jurisdictions,	  still	  reflected	  the	  principle	  that	   ‘a	  husband	  cannot	  be	  guilty	  of	  a	  rape	  committed	  by	  himself	   upon	   his	   lawful	   wife,	   for	   by	   their	   mutual	   matrimonial	   consent	   and	  contract	  the	  wife	  hath	  given	  up	  herself	  in	  this	  kind	  unto	  her	  husband,	  which	  she	  cannot	  retract’	  (Sanday,	  1996:	  61).	  The	  2007	  Act	  also	  reiterated	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  cautionary	  rule	  in	  cases	  of	  sexual	  assault,	  which	  had	  in	  effect	  been	  abolished	  in	  the	  landmark	  case	  of	  S	  v	  Jackson	  (Act	  32,	  2007;	  Maluleke	  &	  Madonsela,	  2009:	  13-­‐14).	   The	   cautionary	   rule	   stated	   that	   in	   cases	   where	   a	   single	   witness	   was	  giving	   evidence,	   caution	   should	   be	   taken	   since	   other	   witnesses	   could	   not	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corroborate	   the	  account	  of	   the	  witness.	  However,	   in	   this	   case	   it	  was	  ruled	   that	  the	   cautionary	   rule	   was	   not	   applicable	   in	   cases	   of	   sexual	   offences,	   which	  characteristically	   only	  had	  a	   single	  witness.	  The	   cautionary	   rule	  was	   abolished	  because	   it	   was	   judged	   as	   based	   on	   the	   out-­‐dated	   and	   false	   assumption	   that	  women	  were	  unreliable	  witnesses	  who	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  “cry	  rape”.	  In	  addition	  to	   reaffirming	   more	   inclusive	   and	   rights-­‐promoting	   laws,	   the	   2007	   Act	   also	  rendered	  ‘evidence	  of	  delay	  in	  reporting’	  (Act	  32,	  2007:	  para.	  59)	  an	  immaterial	  consideration	  in	  the	  final	  judgement	  of	  a	  rape	  trial.	  The	  2007	  Act	  went	  further	  to	  develop	  more	  substantive	   legal	  reform	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  specialist	  Sexual	  Offences	  Courts	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  procedural	  issues	  around	  rape	  trials,	  in	  particular,	  the	  backlog	  of	  cases	  to	  be	  heard	  and	  the	  length	  of	  rape	  trials	  (Walker	  &	   Louw,	   2003).	   The	   objective	   of	   the	   special	   Sexual	   Offences	   Courts	   was	   to	  address	   some	  of	   the	  negative	  experiences	  of	  women	   involved	   in	  a	   rape	   trial	   in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  minimise	  any	  further	  harm.	  	  
	  Internationally,	   rape	   shield	   laws,	   implying	   law	   that	   promotes	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  victim,	  are	  enacted	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Australia,	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States	  of	   America	   to	   minimise	   harm	   brought	   to	   rape	   complainants	   during	   a	   trial.	   In	  particular,	  rape	  shield	  laws	  are	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  negative	  experiences	  of	  women	   whose	   sexual	   activities	   and	   sexual	   histories	   are	   publically	   disclosed.	  These	   laws	   aim	   to	   exclude	   or	   place	   limitations	   on	   ‘all	   reputation	   and	   opinion	  testimony	   concerning	   the	   rape	   complainant’s	   prior	   sexual	   conduct	   while	  allowing	   for	   the	   limited	   admissibility	   of	   evidence	   of	   the	   complainant’s	   specific	  prior	   sexual	   acts’	   (Soshnick,	   1987:	   645).	   In	   South	   Africa,	   rape	   shield	   laws	   are	  articulated	   in	   the	   statute	   about	   evidence	   of	   the	   previous	   sexual	   history	   of	   the	  complainant.	   In	   South	   Africa,	   evidence	   of	   the	   previous	   sexual	   history	   of	   the	  complainant	   is	   only	   admissible	   in	   a	   rape	   trial	   when	   the	   court	   grants	   such	  evidence	  or	  subsequent	  questioning	  as	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  (Pithey	  et.	  al.,	  1999:	  chapt.	  9,	  para.	  1).	  The	  advent	  of	  rape	  shield	  laws	  can	  be	  said	  to	  signify	  the	  justice	  system’s	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  often	  prone	  to	  errors	  in	  the	  form	  fallacies	  and	  myths,	  which	  have	  potential	  to	  bring	  harm	  to	  the	  rape	  complainant	  by	  placing	  the	  rape	  complainant’s	  credibility	  under	  scrutiny	  by	  determining	  the	  complainant	  to	  be	  chaste	  or	  unchaste	  (Berger,	  1977:	  15-­‐20).	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  Still,	   reporting	   rates,	   conviction	   rates	   and	   sentencing	   rates,	   have	   remained	  relatively	   unchanged	   suggesting	   that	   although	   rape	   law	   reform	   has	   made	  progress	   substantively,	   it	   does	   not	   comprehensively	   address	   the	  way	   in	  which	  alleged	   rapes	   are	   dealt	   with.	  What	   this	   shows,	   says	   Goldberg-­‐Ambrose	   (1992:	  175),	   is	   that	  the	  narrow	  approach	  to	   law	  reform	  that	   includes	   laws	  such	  as	  the	  ‘elimination	  of	  corroboration	  and	  resistance	  requirements	  has	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  the	   likelihood	   of	   prosecution	   and	   conviction’.	   Many	   argue	   that	   hostility	   of	   a	  justice	  system	  that	  scrutinises	  rape	  victim	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  reporting	  rates	  and	  sentencing	  rates	  remain	  low.	  The	  public	  nature	  of	  this	  scrutiny	  many	  deter	  rape	  victims	   from	  pursuing	   justice	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	  negative	   societal	   reactions	   and	  attitudes	   that	  emanate	   from	   the	   justice	   system	  after	   the	  act	  of	   rape,	  which	  has	  been	   described	   as	   worse	   than	   the	   actual	   experience	   of	   being	   raped,	   and	  constitutes	  secondary	  victimisation.	  	  The	   limited	   impact	   of	   rape	   law	   reform,	   such	   as	   the	   criminalisation	   of	   marital	  rape	  and	  rape	  shield	  laws	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  the	  justice	  system.	   One	   cannot	   operate	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   justice	   system	   is	  essentially	   ‘hierarchic,	   centralised,	   obedient’	   (Eisenstein,	   Flemming	  &	  Nardulli,	  1988:	  296).	  This	  assumption	  would	  imply	  that	  that	  legal	  rules	  of	  procedure	  and	  legislature	   are	   overarching	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   guide	   and	   control	   the	  behaviour	  of	  legal	  actors	  and	  the	  society	  in	  which	  they	  exist.	  Given	  the	  evidence,	  this	   assumption	   would	   be	   an	   oversimplification	   of	   the	   justice	   system	   and	   an	  overestimation	  of	  the	  power	  of	  legal	  rules.	  	  	  One	  must,	   instead,	   consider	   that	   the	   law	   is	   created,	   reformed,	   interpreted	   and	  enacted	   by	   human	   beings	  who	   exist	   in	   a	   social	   context.	   There	   remains	   a	   clear	  separation	   in	   the	   enactment	   of	   law	   and	   the	   enforcement	   of	   law,	   the	   latter	  requiring	  action	  upon	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  law.	  As	  such,	  the	  law	  is	  subject	  to	  both	  conscious	  and	  subconscious	  attitudes	  of	  individual	  actors	  whose	  often	  excessive	  discretion	  (even	  those	  of	   legal	  actors)	  much	  of	   the	   time,	  may	   be	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   law	   reforms,	   and	   which	   may	   affect	   the	  implementation	   of	   reforms	   (Horney	   &	   Spohn,	   1991:	   150;	   Frohmann	   &	   Mertz:	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1994:	  833;	  Martin	  &	  Powell,	  1994:	  858).	  In	  essence,	  ‘legislation…	  cannot	  destroy	  the	  social	  function	  which	  the	  traditional	  rules	  [of	  rape	  law]	  performed’	  (Feild	  &	  Beinen,	   1980:	   162).	   Therefore,	   legal	   reform	   cannot	   be	   expected	   to	   wholly	  transform	  legal	  institutions	  and	  society	  itself.	  	  In	  patriarchal	  societies,	  sexist	  norms,	  male	  power	  and	  domination	  are	  pervasive	  in	   society,	   resulting	   in	   individuals	   believing	   that	   society	   is	   fundamentally	  structured	   in	   a	   specific	   way,	   with	   women	   and	   men	   occupying	   opposite	   but	  complimentary	   gender	   identities	   and	   roles	   in	   a	   heterosexual	   society.	   In	   such	   a	  society,	   institutional	  structures,	  such	  as	  the	  law,	  reflect	  and	  maintain	  this	  belief	  in	   heteronormativity	   and	   male	   dominion.	   For	   example,	   if	   women	   and	   men	  believe	   in	   the	   inferiority	   of	   women,	   who	   should	   be	   kept	   in	   their	   place	   as	  submissive	   individuals	   by	   any	   means,	   the	   law	   would	   reflect	   a	   disregard	   for	  coercive	   sexual	   acts	   that	   seek	   to	   achieve	   this	   submission.	  Within	   a	   patriarchal	  context,	   issues	   of	   consent	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   heterosexual	   relationships	   and	  intercourse	  make	  the	  claim	  of	  rape	  one	  that	  can	  be	  challenged	  and	  questioned	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   androcentric	   constructions	   of	   consent	   and	   heterosexual	  relationships.	  Mackinnon	  (1983:	  650)	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  often	  due	  to	  the	  blurry	  distinction	  between	  sexuality	  and	  violence	  within	  an	  androcentric	  paradigm.	  The	  justice	  system	  is	  not	  exempt	  from	  these	  biases,	  since	  legal	  actors	  inescapably	  use	  extra-­‐legal	   apparatus	   and	   methods	   to	   enforce	   the	   law.	   Studies	   show	   that	  especially	  in	  cases	  of	  rape,	  victim-­‐blaming	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  questioning	  of	  victims	  by	  advocates.	  Moreover,	  attorneys	  and	   judges	  accept	  certain	  gender	  biases	  and	  reflect	  sexist	  assumptions	  about	  women	  in	  judicial	  decisions.	  The	  police,	  whose	  prior	   contact	   with	   the	   complainant	   and	   detective	   work	   are	   themselves	  structured	   and	   influenced	   by	   gender	   myths	   and	   gender-­‐specific	   stereotypes	  (Maier,	  2012;	  Martin,	  Reynolds	  &	  Keith,	  2002;	  Van	  der	  Bijl	  &	  Rumney,	  2009:	  427;	  Schafran,	   1987;	   Kearney	   &	   Sellers,	   1996;	   Feild,	   1978).	   	   Henderson	   (1993:	   41)	  articulates	  this	  view	  concisely:	  	  Two	  decades	  of	   feminist	   law	  reform	  efforts	   to	  hold	  men	  responsible	   for	  raping	  women	  have	   yielded	   disappointing	   results.	   Rape	  myths,	  woman-­‐
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prosecution	   of	   cases	   not	   meeting	   the	   stereotype	   of	   real	   rape,	   while	   no	  longer	  impossible,	  remains	  improbable.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  the	  problematic	  partiality	  of	   the	   law	   as	   enforced	   by	   legal	   actors,	   especially	   in	   rape	   cases,	   resulted	   in	   the	  initiation	  of	  a	  programme	  focused	  on	  the	  education	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  This	  programme	  aimed	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  gender	  bias	  in	  judicial	   decision-­‐making,	   especially	   in	   gender	   sensitive	   cases	   such	   as	   those	  dealing	  with	  rape,	  family	  law	  and	  custody	  (Wikler,	  1981:	  208).	  This	  response	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  law	  reform	  process	  alone	  cannot	  root	  out	  rape.	  It	  is	  a	   social	   problem.	   The	   law	   alone	   cannot	   solve	   rape	   since	   it	   is	   a	   ‘social	  phenomenon,	   which	   is	   reflective	   of	   deep-­‐seated,	   systemic,	   dysfunctionality	   in	  our	  society’	  (Van	  der	  Bijl	  &	  Rumney,	  2009:	  420).	  What	  this	  discussion	  shows	  is	  that	   due	   to	   the	   complex	   nature	   of	   the	   justice	   system,	   both	   rape	   law	   reform	   as	  well	  as	  extra-­‐legal	  devices	  and	  measures	  that	  address	  the	  social	  face	  of	  rape	  are	  necessary	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  successfully	  enforce	  law	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  guarantees	  justice	  for	  all	  citizens.	  	  
4. Feminist	  Discourse	  Analysis:	  Accounting	  for	  Rape	  	  	  4.1. Discourse	  Analysis:	  Analysing	  Accounts	  	  
4.1.1. Accounts	  	  Scott	   and	   Lyman	   provide	   a	   useful	   set	   of	   definitions	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   for	  understanding	   what	   a	   discourse	   is	   and	   how	   one	   might	   begin	   analysing	  discourses	   to	   uncover	   full	   or	   hidden	  meanings.	   They	   suggest	   that	   ‘talk…	   is	   the	  fundamental	  material	   of	   human	   relations’	   (Scott	  &	   Lyman,	   1968:	   34),	   and	   it	   is	  through	  talking	  that	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  give	  accounts.	  An	  account	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  statement	   made	   to	   explain	   behaviour	   deemed	   socially	   or	   culturally	  inappropriate	  by,	  or	  on	  behalf	  of,	  social	  actors	  (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  46).	  Actors	  convey	   accounts	   by	   employing	   either	   a	   variety	   of	   excuses	   and	   or	   a	   variety	   of	  justifications	   in	   order	   to	   normalise	   or	   neutralise	   an	   act	   (Scott	  &	   Lyman,	   1968:	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46).	  Justifications	  are	  defined	  as	  declarations	  wherein	  the	  perpetrator	  takes	  full	  responsibility	   for	   the	   questioned,	   inappropriate	   act	   but	   also	   argues	   that	   the	  questioned	   act	   should	   be	   permissible,	   or	   perceived	   as	   necessary,	   given	   the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  action	  occurred.	  Excuses	  are	  defined	  as	  the	  admission	  of	  the	  questioned	  act	  as	  impermissible	  with	  a	  denial	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  for	  the	  questioned	  act	  (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  47).	  	  The	  authors	  then	  suggest	  that	  ‘every	  account	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  underlying	  negotiation	   of	   identities’	   (Scott	  &	   Lyman,	   1968:	   59).	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that	  within	  every	   account,	   each	   actor	   has	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   identity.	   The	   authors	   give	   an	  example	  where,	  in	  instances	  of	  theft,	  one	  person	  is	  identified	  as	  the	  alleged	  thief,	  and	   the	   other	   as	   alleged	   victim.	   However,	   identities	   are	   subject	   to	   negotiation	  through	  the	  process	  of	  the	  evaluation	  of	  each	  account	  by	  those	  that	  hear	  it.	  This	  means	   that,	   through	   the	  process	  of	  account	  giving,	  which	   is	  also	   the	  process	  of	  negotiation,	   identities	  do	  not	   remain	   stable	   and	  may	  even	   switch.	  Therefore,	   if	  the	  alleged	  thief	  gives	  an	  account	  that	  diminishes	  responsibility,	  her	  identity	  as	  a	  social	  deviant	  may	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  alleged	  victim	  whose	  attachment	  to	  her	  identity	   as	   victim	   becomes	   doubtful,	   thereby	   bringing	   her	   entire	   claim	   into	  question.	  The	  process	  of	   identity	  switching	  can	  also	  be	  facilitated	  by	  the	  vested	  interest	   of	   the	   hearer,	   as	   they	  may	   show	   bias	   toward	   a	   particular	   account	   by	  accommodating	  a	  specific	  account	  over	  another	  (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  60).	  This	  often	  results	  in	  proceedings	  where	  the	  victim,	  rather	  than	  the	  perpetrator,	  is	  put	  on	  trial	  (Donat	  &	  D’Emilio,	  1992:	  13;	  Horney	  &	  Spohn,	  1991:	  117).	  	  When	  an	  account	  cannot	  be	  rationalised	  or	  normalised	  as	  commonsense	  within	  a	  specific	  context,	  in	  which	  social	  expectations	  for	  behaviour	  exist	  as	  social	  facts,	  it	  is	   deemed	   unreasonable	   (Scott	   &	   Lyman,	   1968:	   54).	   Such	   an	   account	   is,	  therefore,	   not	   recognised	   by	   the	   society	   and	   is	   subject	   to	   social	   sanctions.	   In	  contrast,	  when	  an	  account	  is	  perceived	  as	  making	  sense,	  it	  qualifies	  as	  a	  “normal”	  account	   and	   is	   honoured	   by	   society.	   Accounts	   and	   certain	   patterns	   of	  argumentation	   can,	   and	   often	   do,	   become	   systemic	   and	   established	   within	  cultures	   (Scott	   &	   Lyman,	   1968:	   52-­‐53;	   Anderson	   &	   Doherty,	   2008:	   2).	   These	  patterns	  of	  attribution	  are	  especially	  apparent	  in	  social	  and	  cultural	  reactions	  to	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instances	   of	   sexual	   violence,	   demonstrated	   especially	   well	   in	   circumstances	  involving	  rape.	  	  
4.1.2. Discourse	  Analysis	  	  ‘Discourse	   analysis	   is	   analysis	   of	   discourse,	   or	   text’	   (Lee,	   2000:	   188).	   It	   is	   a	  method	   that	   recognises	   and	   emphasizes	   ‘the	   significance	   of	   language	   and	  discourse	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   knowledge	   and	   the	   formation	   of	   persons	   or	  subject’	   (Poynton	   &	   Lee,	   2000:	   1).	   This	   recognition	   is	   based	   on	   Foucauldian	  theory	  of	  societies	  as	  constituting	  influential	  interrelations	  between	  individuals,	  institutions	   and	   discourse.	   Understanding	   discourse	   analysis	   in	   this	   particular	  manner	  may	  explain	  why	  this	  method	  cautions	  against	  simply	  analysing	  the	  use	  of	  language.	  Analysing	  the	  use	  of	  language	  can	  simply	  be	  understood	  as	  studying	  linguistics,	   however	   discourse	   analysis,	   recognising	   language	   and	   text	   as	  embedded	  within,	   and	   informing	   social	   contexts,	   seeks	   to	  understand	  meaning	  (Poyton	   &	   Lee,	   2000:	   5,	   23).	   Therefore,	   the	   practice	   of	   discourse	   analysis	   of	  accounts,	   would	   produce	   findings	   reflecting	   the	   meaning	   of	   specific	   kinds	   of	  accounts,	  as	  illustrated	  above.	  	  4.2. Feminist	  Discourse	  Analysis	  	  Feminist	   discourse	   analysis	   differs	   from	   discourse	   analysis	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  feminist	  discourse	  analysis	  emphasises	  a	  gender	  perspective.	  It	  seeks	  to	  identify	  the	  types	  of	  discourses	  that	  dominate	  ‘networks	  of	  meaning	  and	  representation’	  (Pether	  &	  Threadgold,	  2000:	  139)	  as	  well	  as	   identify	   institutions	  and	  practices	  that	   perpetuate	   this	   domination.	   Butler	   (1990:	   270)	   argues	   that	   within	  institutions,	  behaviour	  is	  normalised	  and	  becomes	  normative	  through	  perpetual	  enactment	   over	   time.	   Therefore,	   normal	   modes	   of	   behaviour	   become	  entrenched,	   constructing	   reality	   in	   a	   particular	   way.	   These	   norms	   apply	   to	  gender	  wherein	  individuals	  refer	  to	  the	  way	  norms	  are	  constructed,	  so	  as	  to	  act	  in	  adherence	  to	  these	  norms.	  By	  doing	  so	  these	  individuals	  do	  two	  things.	  Firstly,	  they	   are	   ‘actualised’	   (Butler,	   1990:	   272)	   or	   identified	   as	   embodying	   a	   specific	  gender	  and	  secondly,	  they	  reproduce	  the	  established	  reality.	  Feminist	  discourse	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analysis	   seeks	   to	   disrupt	   the	   process	   of	   reproduction	   and	   actualisation	   that	   is	  generally	   taken	   for	  granted.	   It	  questions	  assumptions	  about	  gender,	   challenges	  the	   limitations	   of	   the	  ways	   gender	   is	   constructed,	   and	   interrogates	   how	   these	  assumptions	  and	  limitations	  permeate	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	   ‘law,	  culture	  and	  religion’	   (Tamale,	   2013:	   12).	   In	   doing	   so,	   feminist	   discourse	   analysis	   identifies	  the	   ‘fictitious	   character’	   of	   gender	   norms	   and	   how	   norms	   are	   perpetuated	  through	  action,	  challenging	  understanding	  of	  norms	  as	  a	  priori.	  Interrogating	  the	  notion	   of	   rape	   myths,	   or	   social	   interpretations	   of	   rape,	   has	   been	   the	   work	   of	  feminist	   discourse	   analysis,	   which	   seeks	   to	   uncover	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  patriarchal	   norms	   are	   perpetuated	   within	   the	   law,	   informing	   individual	  responses	  that	  seek	  to	  enforce	  and	  maintain	  the	  gender	  hierarchy.	  I	  discuss	  the	  ways	   in	   which	   rape	   is	   socially	   constructed	   and	   understood,	   within	   a	   gender-­‐biased	  perspective,	  below.	  	  4.3. Rape	  Myths:	  Social	  Accounts	  of	  Rape	  	  
4.3.1. Social	  Meanings	  of	  Rape:	  Rape	  Myths	  	  Rape	  can,	  and	  often	  does,	  have	  different	  social	  meanings	  (Feild,	  1978:	  156;	  Donat	  &	   D’Emilio,	   1992:	   14;	   LaFree,	   1980:	   834).	   Cases	   of	   sexual	   assault	   exhibit	   how	  rape	  has	   a	   social	  meaning	   that	   is	   not	   always	   coherent	  with	   legal	   definitions	  of	  rape.	   Therefore,	   what	   counts	   as	   rape,	   in	   strictly	   legal	   terms,	   is	   not	   always	  reflected	  in	  societal	  and	  individual	  reactions	  to,	  and	  evaluations	  of,	  alleged	  rapes.	  Social	  meanings	  of	   rape,	   or	  beliefs	   concerning	   rape	   are	  present	   in	   every	   social	  actor,	  whether	   lay	   or	   profession	   such	   as	   citizens,	  media,	   rapists,	   judges,	   jurors	  and	   rape	   crisis	   counsellors	   (Feild,	   1978:	   157;	   Rozée,	   1993:	   500).	   How	   social	  meanings	  of	  rape	  differ	  varies	  from	  individual	  to	  individual,	  however	  particular	  understandings	  and	  social	  meanings	  of	  rape	  can	  be	  prominent	  in	  society.	  	  	  These	   socially	   constructed	   definitions	   of	   rape	   are	   notable	   in	   social	   discourses,	  perceptions,	   attitudes	   and	   practices.	   This	   means	   that	   different	   individual	  narratives	  of	  rape	  can	  be	  deemed	  more	  or	  less	  socially	  acceptable	  and	  condoned	  despite	   the	   acceptance	   that	   a	   woman	   was	   violated	   (Rozée,	   1993:	   505).	   A	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distinction	  between	  what	  is	  considered	  ‘real’	  (Estricht,	  1987)	  rape	  and	  legitimate	  rape	  involves	  considerations	  of	  consent	  and	  the	  violation	  of	  social	  norms	  or	  what	  is	   socially	   considered	   the	  prototypical	   rape.	   This	   results	   in	   an	   assessment	   of	   a	  victim	   as	   a	   ‘genuine	   victim’	   (Anderson	   &	   Doherty,	   2008:	   5;	  MacKinnon,	   1983:	  651;	  Martin	  &	  Powell,	  1994:	  879)	  or	  a	  fraud	  or	  vindictive	  accuser.	  What	  follows	  is	   that	   a	   genuine	   victim,	   whose	   allegation	   is	   seen	   as	   legitimate,	   is	   afforded	  unlimited	   access	   to	   social	   and	   legal	   resources	   (such	   as	   sympathy	   and	   legal	  counsel),	  whilst	  the	  fraud	  or	  vindictive	  accuser	  is	  socially	  sanctioned	  in	  the	  form	  of	  more	  severe	  legal	  convictions.	  This	  is	  done	  through	  a	  process	  of	  individual	  or	  collective	  perceptions	  of	  responsibility	  followed	  by	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources.	  	  	  
4.3.2. Rape	  Myths	  	  Social	   explanations	   and	   accounts	   for	   rape	   can	   ‘excuse,	   justify	   or	   exonerate	   the	  socially	  sanctionable	  behaviour	  of	  self	  or	  other’	  (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	  2008:	  2).	  These	  arguments	  do	  so	  by	  attributing	  responsibility	  to	  and	  blaming	  the	  victims,	  absolving	   the	   perpetrator’s	   responsibility	   and	   minimising	   the	   severity	   of	   the	  rape,	  resulting	  in	  prejudiced	  judgements	  of	  victims.	  Social	  meanings	  of	  rape	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  rape	  myths.	  	  First	   defined	   by	   Burt	   (1980:	   217)	   as	   ‘prejudicial,	   stereotyped	   or	   false	   beliefs	  about	   rape,	   rape	   victims	   and	   rapists’,	   rape	   myths	   are	   socially	   and	   culturally	  located	  beliefs	  about	  rape	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  rape	  that	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  empirical	  evidence	  (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	  2008:	  9).	  The	  beliefs	  are	  articulated	  in	  specific	  ways,	  often	  by	  the	  use	  of	  language	  through	  argumentation.	  Examples	  of	  common	   articulations	   of	   rape	   myths	   include	   ‘only	   bad	   girls	   get	   raped;	   any	  healthy	   woman	   can	   resist	   a	   rapist	   if	   she	   really	   wants	   to;	   woman	   ask	   for	   it;	  women	  “cry	  rape”	  only	  when	  they’ve	  been	  jilted	  or	  have	  something	  to	  cover	  up;	  rapists	   are	   sex-­‐starved,	   insane,	   or	   both’	   (Burt,	   1980:	   217).	   Rape	   myths,	   as	  understood	  from	  a	  feminist	  perspective	  attempt	  to	  show	  how	  the	  commonplace	  understandings	   of	   rape,	   including	   rape	   within	   the	   law,	   reconstruct	   and	  reproduce	   patriarchal	   conceptions	   of	   gender	   in	   a	   multitude	   of	   ways.	   Feminist	  critique	   therefore	   shows	   how	   in	   certain	   circumstances,	   including	   in	   the	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courtroom,	   the	   production	   of	   accounts	   of	   rape	   can	   serve	   to	   emphasise	  conventional	  myths,	   and	  at	   the	   same	   time	  undermine	  or	  worsen	   the	   traumatic	  experience	   of	   rape	   for	   the	   victim.	   Because	   of	   the	   various	   ways	   in	   which	   rape	  myths	  can	  be	  articulated,	  understanding	  what	  informs	  or	  underlies	  rape	  myths	  is	  useful.	  	  	  
4.3.3. What	  Counts	  as	  Rape:	  Burt’s	  Four	  Underlying	  Beliefs	  	  Burt	   (1980)	   identifies	   four	   underlying	   beliefs	   about	   rape	   that	   are	   useful	   in	  understanding	   what	   produces	   specific	   accounts	   of	   rape	   and	   informs	   specific	  commentary	  with	  regards	  to	  rape.	  As	  such,	  one	  can	  categorise	  accounts	  of	  rape	  in	   terms	   of	   one	   of	   the	   four	   underlying	   beliefs	   listed	   and	   described	   below.	  Although	   not	   exhaustive,	   Burt’s	   four	   categories	   serve	   as	   a	   useful	   model	   for	  understanding	   articulations	   of	   rape	   myths.	   Burt	   (1980:	   218)	   attributes	   the	  acceptance	   of	   rape	   myths	   to	   the	   following	   four	   underlying	   beliefs:	   ‘sex	   role	  stereotyping,	  adversarial	  sexual	  belief,	  sexual	  conservatism,	  and	  the	  acceptance	  of	  interpersonal	  violence’.	  	  	  4.3.3.1. Sex	  Role	  Stereotyping	  	  If	  one	  holds	  an	  underlying	  belief	  in	  sex	  role	  stereotyping,	  which	  is	  a	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	   assumptions	   about	   what	   roles	   men	   and	   women	   assume	   in	   the	   home,	   the	  workplace	   and	   in	   society,	   one	   may	   hold	   views	   around	   the	   nature	   and	   role	   of	  women	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  1976;	  Goldberg-­‐Ambrose,	  1992;	  LeVine,	  1959:	  968).	  These	  views	  often	  entail	  beliefs	   in	   the	   role	  of	  women	   in	   society	  as	  either	   subservient	  wives	   and	  mothers	   or	   virgins	  with	   aspirations	   of	  marriage.	   Therefore,	  women	  who	   violate	   sex	   role	   norms	   tend	   to	   provoke	   punitive	   reactions	   and	   attitudes.	  This	   is	   evidenced	   in	   studies	   that	   show	   that	   ‘married	   women	   and	   virgins	   are	  generally	   seen	   as	   more	   social	   respectable	   than	   a	   divorcee’	   (Jones	   &	   Aronson,	  1973:	  416).	  Sex	  role	  stereotyping	  is	  articulated	  in	  expressions	  such	  as:	  	  A	  woman	  should	  be	  a	  virgin	  when	  she	  marries	  (Burt,	  1980:	  222).	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Additionally,	  accounts	  of	  rape	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  excuse	  may	  also	  indicate	  a	  belief	  in	   sex	   role	   stereotyping,	   namely	   ‘appeals	   to	   defeasibility’	   –	   claims	   that	   can	   be	  annulled	   –	   and	   scapegoating	   (Scott	   &	   Lyman,	   1968:	   48,	   50).	   Appeals	   to	  defeasibility	   argue	   that	   an	   individual	   acts	   in	   a	   socially	   unacceptable	   manner	  because	  ‘his	  “will”	  was	  not	  completely	  “free”’	  (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  48;	  Donat	  &	  D’Emilio,	   1992:	   11).	   Therefore,	   appeals	   to	   defeasibility	   argue	   a	   somewhat	  fatalistic,	  determinist	  view.	  Such	  arguments	  will	  often	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  sex-­‐linked	  traits	  that	  govern	  individual	  behaviour,	  even	  if	  the	  individual	  wills	  it	  not	  to	  be	  so.	  One	  common	  appeal	  to	  defeasibility	   in	  the	  context	  of	  rape	  argues	  that	  male	   sexuality	   is	   governed	   by	   an	   ‘irresistible	   sexual	   impulse’	   (Anderson	   &	  Doherty,	   2008:	   8;	   Feild,	   1978:	   161).	   Therefore,	   any	   ‘normal’	   man,	   sexually	  provoked	  by	  a	  woman,	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  act	  out	  his	  sexual	  desires	  whether	  he	  wants	  to	  or	  not	  and	  even	  if	  he	  knows	  it	  to	  be	  an	  unacceptable	  act.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	   this	   account	   of	   defeasibility	   may	   not	   only	   eliminate	   a	   man’s	  responsibility	  in	  an	  alleged	  act,	  it	  may	  also	  place	  responsibility	  on	  the	  accuser	  by	  means	  of	  scapegoating.	  Scapegoating	  is	  defined	  as	  making	  an	  allegation	  that	  the	  questioned	   act	   and	   behaviour	   is	   ‘a	   response	   to	   the	   behaviour	   or	   attitudes	   of	  another’	  (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  50).	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  understanding	  the	  claim	  that	  men	  are	  innately	  virile	  is	  a	  factual	  social	  claim.	  Therefore,	  an	  accuser,	  despite	  knowing	   the	  possible	  outcome	  of	   any	  kind	  of	   sexual	  provocation,	  must	  have	  acted	  in	  a	  provocative	  manner.	  In	  instances	  of	  alleged	  rape,	  this	  reversal	  of	  responsibility	   often	   ‘casts	   women	   as	   the	   gatekeepers	   of	   male	   sexual	   impulse’	  (Anderson	   &	   Doherty,	   2008:	   8).	   Clear	   articulations	   of	   this	   excuse	   include	  expressions	  such	  as	  ‘only	  bad	  girls	  get	  raped’	  (Burt,	  1980:	  217).	  
	   ‘In	   the	   majority	   of	   rapes,	   the	   victim	   is	   promiscuous	   or	   has	   a	   bad	  reputation’	  (Burt,	  1980:	  223).	  	  One	   example	   that	   illustrates	   the	   interplay	   between	   appeals	   to	   defeasibility,	  scapegoating	   and	   sex	   role	   stereotyping	   is	   the	   example	   of	   the	   ‘sexually	  provocative	  woman’	   (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	   2008:	   2).	   The	   sexually	   provocative	  woman	  is	  seen	  as	  deviant,	  and	  therefore	  unacceptable,	  in	  her	  social	  role,	  her	  job,	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her	  appearance,	  her	  behaviour,	  her	   sexual	  history,	  or	  her	  marital	   status	   (Feild,	  1978:	  156,	  161;	  Rozée,	  1993:	  505,	  510;	  Van	  der	  Bijl	  &	  Rumney,	  2009:	  421-­‐422;	  Westmarland	  &	  Graham,	  2010:	  88).	  She,	  in	  some	  way,	  violates	  social	  perceptions	  and	  constructions	  of	  femininity.	  Therefore,	  the	  sexually	  provocative	  woman	  can	  be	  the	  stripper,	  the	  women	  wearing	  a	  revealing	  skirt,	  the	  flirtatious	  woman,	  the	  promiscuous	   woman,	   the	   woman	   with	   many	   sexual	   partners,	   the	   unmarried	  woman,	  the	  woman	  who	  is	  not	  a	  virgin,	  and	  the	  divorcee	  (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	  2008:	   2-­‐3;	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   1976;	   Jones	   &	   Aronson,	   1973;	   Rozée,	   1993:	   505;	  MacKinnon,	  1983:	  648;	  LeGrand,	  1973:	  939).	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  choices	  and	  her	  social	   status,	   which	   deviates	   from	   the	   norm,	   the	   woman	   is	   perceived	   as	  blameworthy	  and	  contributing,	  in	  some	  manner,	  to	  her	  victimisation	  because	  she	  either	  explicitly	  provokes	  or	  implicitly	  welcomes	  socially	  questionable	  behaviour	  (Donat	  &	  D’Emilio,	  1992:	  14;	  LaFree,	  1980:	  834;	  Policastro	  &	  Payne,	  2013:	  332;	  Torrey,	  1990:	  1025).	  	  A	   survey	   of	   a	   group	   of	   South	   African	   men	   across	   ranges	   of	   age	   and	   class	   by	  CIETAfrica	   (2000)	   illustrates	   empirically	   an	   adherence	   to	   beliefs	   in	   sex	   role	  stereotyping.	   ‘One	   in	   four	  men	   said	   that	   a	  woman	  means	   “yes”	  when	   she	   says	  “no”’(CIETAfrica,	   2000:	   2)	   with	   20	   percent	   of	   the	   respondents	   admitting	   to	  having	   sexual	   intercourse	   with	   a	   woman	   without	   her	   consent.	   This	   view	  articulates	   the	   belief	   in	   the	   need	   for	  woman	   to	   display	   feminine	  modesty	   and	  chastity.	  This	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  the	  view	  that	  ‘it	  is	  better	  for	  a	  woman	  to	  use	  her	  feminine	   charm	   to	   get	   what	   she	   wants	   rather	   than	   ask	   for	   it	   outright’	   (Burt,	  1980:	  222).	  	  4.3.3.2. Sexual	  Conservatism	  	  Sexual	   conservatism	   refers	   to	   ‘conditions	   or	   circumstances	   under	   which	   sex	  should	   occur’	   (Burt,	   1980:	   218).	   An	   example	   of	   a	   sexual	   conservatism	   would	  argue	  that	  sex	  only	  occurs	   in	  heterosexual	  marriages	  and	  entails	  penile-­‐vaginal	  intercourse,	   and	  as	   such,	   any	  homosexual	   acts	   are	  unacceptable	  and	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  within	  this	  framework,	  even	  in	  cases	  of	  violence.	  Therefore,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  one	  constructs	  permissible	  sexual	  acts	  determines	  how	  varied	  sexual	  acts	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are	  judged.	  Conceptions	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  status	  of	  relationships	  and	  notions	  of	  consent	   often	   inform	   this	   view.	   	   An	   example	   of	   this	   view	   would	   be	   someone	  declaring	   that:	   	   ‘I	   would	   have	   no	   respect	   for	   a	  woman	  who	   engages	   in	   sexual	  relationships	  without	  any	  emotional	  involvement’	  (Burt,	  1980:	  222).	  This	  kind	  of	  declaration	   suggests	   that	   the	   nature	   of	   ‘normal’	   relationships	   involves	   an	  emotional	  connection.	  Therefore,	  relationships	  that	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  this	  norm	  are	   open	   to	   interpretation	   if	   sexual	   allegations	   are	  made.	   If	   a	   claim	   of	   rape	   is	  made	   by	   a	   woman	   involved	   in	   a	   sexual	   relationship	   without	   emotional	  attachment,	   responsibility	   and	   blame	   become	   open	   to	   interrogation.	   Another	  significant	   notion	   in	   sexual	   conservatism	   is	   consent.	   If	   one	   believes	   that	   sex	  should	   occur	   with	   consent,	   different	   notions	   of	   consent	   (Rozée	   &	   Koss,	   2001:	  302)	  can	  produce	  different	  evaluations	  of	  one	  sexual	  interaction.	  For	  example	  if	  an	  individual	  holds	  the	  view	  that	  ‘a	  woman	  who	  goes	  to	  the	  home	  or	  apartment	  of	  a	  man	  on	  their	   first	  date	   implies	   that	  she	   is	  willing	  to	  have	  sex’	   (Burt,	  1980:	  223),	  rape	  cannot	  be	  claimed	  under	  these	  consensual	  circumstances.	  Notions	  of	  the	   nature	   and	   status	   of	   relationships	   and	   consent	   operate	   in	   a	   manner	   that	  determines	   the	   allocations	   of	   responsibility	   and	   blame	   in	   contested	   sexual	  occurrences.	  	  	  An	   account	   of	   rape,	  which	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   informed	   by	   an	   underlying	   belief	   in	  sexual	   conservatism,	   is	   a	   justification	   that	   involves	   the	   ‘denial	   of	   the	   injury’	  (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  51).	  This	   justification	   involves	   the	  view	   that	   an	  accuser	  who	   is	   viewed	   as	   deserving	   of	   the	   questioned	   treatment	   is	   disqualified	   from	  being	  viewed	  as	  an	   injured	  victim.	  Therefore,	   if	   the	  alleged	  sexual	  act	  does	  not	  violate	  the	  normative	  conditions	  for	  an	  acceptable	  sexual	  act,	  each	  party	  is	  seen	  as	  deserving	  of	  the	  outcome	  and	  no	  party	  qualifies	  for	  a	  claim	  of	  injury.	  I	  use	  two	  examples	  to	  illustrate	  sexual	  conservatism.	  	  	  Often	   a	   distinction	   is	   drawn	   between	   stranger	   rape,	   acquaintance	   rape	   and	  marital.	  Stranger	  rape	  is	  rape	  that	  occurs	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  generally	  assessed	  as	  the	  most	  prototypical,	   therefore	  “real”,	  rape	  even	  though	  it	   is	  estimated	  that	  more	   than	   half	   of	   all	   rapes	   are	   committed	   by	   individuals	   known	   to	   the	   rape	  victim	  (Rozée,	  1993:	  504-­‐505;	  LaFree,	  1980:	  836;	  Bublick,	  1999:	  1446;	  LeGrand,	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1973:	  922;	  McDonald,	  2009).	  This	  distinction	  is	  made	  despite	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  shows	  that	  acquaintance	  rape	  is	   just	  as	  common	  or	  sometimes	  more	  likely	  than	   stranger	   rape	   (Jewkes	   et.	   al.,	   2010:	   26;	   Jewkes	   et.	   al.,	   1999;	   Donat	   &	  D’Emilio,	  1992:	  17;	  Kanin	  &	  Parcell,	  1977).	  A	  study	  involving	  pregnant	  women	  in	  Soweto	  revealed	  how	  7,9%	  of	  women	  were	  raped	  by	  a	  non-­‐partner	  in	  adulthood,	  whilst	   20,1%	   had	   been	   sexually	   abused	   by	   an	   intimate	   partner	   such	   as	   their	  husband	   or	   boyfriend	   (Dunkle,	   Jewkes,	  Nduna,	   Levin,	   Jama,	   Khuzwayo,	   Koss	  &	  Duvvury,	  2006).	  	  	  Sexual	   conservatism,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   belief	   that	   rape	   cannot	   occur	   between	  intimate	   acquaintances,	   for	   example	   within	   a	   heterosexual	   marriage,	   would	  argue	  that	  marital	  rape	  is	  simply	  not	  possible	  and	  should	  be	  reconceptualised	  as	  sex	   (LeVine,	   1959:	   969;	   MacKinnon,	   1983;	   648-­‐649).	   Therefore,	   this	   belief	  justifies	   the	   act	   of	  marital	   rape	  by	  denying	   injury	  or	  diminishing	  harm.	  This	   is	  made	   clear	   in	   the	   assertion	   that	   ‘the	   emotional	   trauma	   suffered	   by	   a	   person	  victimized	   by	   an	   individual	  with	  whom	   sexual	   intimacy	   is	   shared	   as	   a	   normal	  part	  of	  an	  ongoing	  marital	  relationship	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  severe	  as	  that	  suffered	  by	  a	   person	   who	   is	   victimised	   by	   one	   with	   whom	   that	   intimacy	   is	   not	   shared’	  (MacKinnon,	   1983:	   649;	  Van	  der	  Bijl	  &	  Rumney,	   2009:	   421).	   Another	   example	  that	   illustrates	  sexual	  conservatism	  as	  well	  as	  how	  denials	  of	   injury	   interact,	   is	  the	  argument	  that	  ‘any	  healthy	  woman	  can	  resist	  a	  rapist	  if	  she	  really	  wants	  to’	  (Burt,	   1980:	   217).	   This	   argument	   is	   based	   on	   the	   underlying	   belief	   that	   sex	   is	  consensual	   and	   non-­‐consent	   can	   be	   identified	   by	  means	   of	   resistance	   of	   some	  kind,	   of	   which	   any	   healthy	   women	   is	   capable	   (Donat	   &	   D’Emilio,	   1992:	   13;	  Westmarland	  &	  Graham,	  2010:	  93).	  Therefore,	  if	  there	  are	  no	  signs	  of	  resistance,	  either	   in	   the	   accuser’s	   failure	   to	   say	   “no”	   clearly	   or	   a	   lack	   of	   physical	   signs	   of	  injury,	   then	   the	   accuser	  may	   be	   judged	   to	   be	   deserving	   of	   the	   questioned	   act	  (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	  2008:	  3,9;	  Rozée,	  1993:	  511;	  Horney	  &	  Spohn,	  1991:	  118;	  Van	   der	   Bijl	   &	   Rumney,	   2009:	   427;	   Hill,	   2014:	   471,	   473).	   Both	   examples	  delegitimise	   the	   allegation	   in	   its	   entirety	   because	   it	   does	   not	   conform	   to	  normative	   conditions	   of	   rape	   despite	   evidence	   that	   shows	   that	   women’s	  responses	   prior	   to	   and	   during	   rape	   vary	   greatly.	   A	   study	   by	   Gidycz,	   Van	  Wynsberghe	  and	  Edwards	  (2008;	  LeGrand,	  1973:	  924)	  shows	  that	  whilst	  some	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women	   may	   use	   verbal	   and	   physical	   forms	   of	   resistance	   some	   women	   may	  become	   immobile	   and	   submissive	   in	   response	   to	   threats	   of	   sexual	   assault	   and	  sexual	  assault.	  	  	  4.3.3.3. Adversarial	  Sexual	  Beliefs	  	  	  Adversarial	  sexual	  beliefs	  are	  characterised	  by	  the	  belief	   in,	  and	  expectation	  of,	  the	   fundamentally	   exploitative	   nature	   of	   sexual	   relationships,	   in	   which	   each	  party	  within	  the	  relationship	  is	  viewed	  as	  untrustworthy,	  vindictive,	  selfish	  and	  manipulative	   (Burt,	   1980:	   218;	   Torrey,	   1990:	   1025).	   Individuals	   that	   hold	  adversarial	  beliefs	  would,	  in	  turn,	  perceive	  acts	  of	  sexual	  aggression	  as	  expected	  and	   therefore	   not	   traumatic	   for	   victims.	   Holding	   a	   belief	   in	   adversarial	   sexual	  relationships	  means	   rape	   is	  understood	  as	   simply	  another	   form	  of	  exploitation	  within	   a	   sexual	   relationship.	   This	   underlying	   belief	   is	   most	   apparent	   in	   the	  example	  of	  the	  vindictive	  woman	  in	  cases	  of	  rape.	  The	  vindictive	  woman	  is	  seen	  as	  sly	  and	  manipulative	  and	  her	  claim	  of	  rape	  may	  be	  questioned	  on	  this	  basis.	  She	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  alleging	  rape	  against	  a	  man	  with	  whom	  she	  had	  consensual	  sex,	   for	  some	  gain	  such	  as	  covering	  up	   ‘infidelity,	  pregnancy,	  or	  sexual	  disease’	  (Rozée	  &	  Koss,	  2001:	  303;	  Frohmann,	  1991:	  221-­‐222),	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  a	  man	  who	   dismissed	   or	   hurt	   her.	   This	   is	   often	   articulated	   in	   the	   expression	   that	  ‘woman	  lie	  about	  rape’	  (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	  2008:	  9;	  MacKinnon,	  1983:	  653)	  or	  the	   expression	   that	   ‘women	   “cry	   rape”	   only	   when	   they’ve	   been	   jilted	   or	   have	  something	   to	   cover	   up’	   (Burt,	   1980:	   217;	  Westmarland	   &	   Graham,	   2010:	   98).	  These	  expressions	  bring	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  claims	  of	  rape	   into	  question,	   thereby	  reallocating	   degrees	   of	   responsibility	   and	   blame	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   favours	   the	  account	  of	  the	  accused.	  	  	  4.3.3.4. Acceptance	  of	  Interpersonal	  Violence	  	  Acceptance	  of	  interpersonal	  violence	  refers	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  ‘force	  and	  coercion	  are	   legitimate	   ways	   to	   gain	   compliance’	   (Burt,	   1980:	   218),	   specifically	   in	   the	  context	   of	   intimate,	   sexual	   relationships.	   Therefore,	   acts	   of	   violence	   in	   the	  context	  of	  intimate	  relationships	  are	  perceived	  as	  acceptable	  and	  legitimate.	  An	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account	  of	  rape	  that	  accepts	  interpersonal	  violence	  serves	  to	  reject	  the	  status	  of	  the	  victim	  as	  a	  victim	  in	  a	  sexually	  intimate	  context.	  A	  ‘denial	  of	  the	  victim’	  (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  51)	   is	   a	   justification	   in	  which	   the	  accused	  evaluates	   the	  act	   in	  question	   as	   acceptable	   and	   permissible	   since	   the	   accuser	   is	   deserving	   of	   the	  injury.	  The	  accuser	  may	  be	  prone	  to	  being	  seen	  as	  deserving	  of	  injury	  especially	  when	  he	  or	  she	  occupies	  a	   ‘normatively	  discrepant	  role’	   (Scott	  &	  Lyman,	  1968:	  51)	   or	   forms	  part	   of	   a	  minority	   group.	  One	   shows	   acceptance	   of	   interpersonal	  violence	  when	  one	  declares	  that	  ‘many	  times	  a	  woman	  will	  pretend	  she	  doesn’t	  want	   to	   have	   intercourse	   because	   she	   doesn’t	   want	   to	   seem	   loose,	   but	   she’s	  really	  hoping	  the	  man	  will	  force	  her’	  (Burt,	  1980:	  222).	  	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  belief	  system	  is	  how	  victims	  of	  stranger	  rape	  often	  elicit	  the	  most	   sympathy	   since	   they	   are	   perceived	   are	   holding	   no	   responsibility	   in	   the	  assault,	  whereas	  victims	  of	  acquaintance	  rape	  are	  perceived	  as	  being	  somewhat	  responsible	  for	  the	  assault	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  rapist	  is	  known	  to	  them	  (Smith,	  Keating,	  Hester	  &	  Mitchell,	  1976;	  Rozée	  &	  Koss,	  2001:	  303;	  LaFree,	  1980:	  833).	  However,	   the	   response	   can	   be	   understood	   if	   one	   recognises	   that	   it	   is	   a	  manifestation	  of	  an	  underlying	  belief	  in	  the	  acceptance	  of	  interpersonal	  violence.	  	  	  One	   can	   suggest	   that	   the	   acceptance	   of	   interpersonal	   violence	   can	   operate	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  intimate,	  sexual	  relations.	  Anderson	  &	  Doherty’s	  (2008:	  9)	  presentation	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  hazard	  and	  risk	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  sexual	  violent	  incidences	   clarifies	   this	  proposition.	  Here,	   the	  authors	   suggest	   that	  hazard	  and	  risk	  in	  relation	  to	  sexual	  violence	  is	  socially	  constructed	  and	  accepted	  as	  known	  in	  a	  common-­‐sense	  manner	  by	  members	  of	  society	  (Bublick,	  1999:1489).	  As	  such	  individuals	   should	   be	   able	   to	   ascertain	   or	   measure	   the	   riskiness	   of	   all	   social	  situations	  in	  order	  to	  take	  appropriate	  precautions,	  except	  those	  individuals	  that	  are	  either	  naïve	  or	  stupid.	  Therefore,	  a	  woman	  who	  is	  raped	  while	  inebriated	  or	  in	  a	  dark,	  deserted	   location	   is	   judged	  under	   the	  assumption	  of	  hazard	  and	  risk	  perception	   (Rozée,	   1993:	   511;	   Bublick,	   1999:	   1431-­‐1432;	   Policastro	   &	   Payne,	  2013:	  334;	  Frese,	  Moya	  &	  Megias,	  2004:	  146).	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  rape	  victim	  will	  be	  perceived	  as	  stupid,	  socially	  naïve,	  or	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  harm	  but	  willing	   to	   take	   the	   risk,	   and,	   thus,	   careless	  or	   ‘asking	   for	   it’	   (Smith	  et	  al.,	  1976:	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355;	   Rozée	   &	   Koss,	   2001:	   304;	   Westmarland	   &	   Graham,	   2010:	   89).	   These	  judgements	  often	  result	  in	  the	  assigning	  of	  undesirable	  traits	  to	  the	  rape	  victim,	  such	   as	   stupidity,	   or	   the	   assigning	   of	   some	   level	   of	   responsibility	   to	   the	   rape	  victim	  since	  they	  acted	  in	  a	  contradictory	  manner	  to	  social	  standards	  of	  hazard	  and	  risk	  behaviours.	  Notion	  of	  hazard	  and	  risk	  behaviours	  construct	  what	  can	  be	  called	  the	  reasonable	  woman	  as	  someone	  who	  ‘is	  afraid	  –	  of	  going	  out,	  of	  letting	  someone	   in,	  of	  rape.	  She	   is	  always	  on	  guard,	  and	  her	   fear	  of	  rape	  shapes	  every	  aspect	  of	  her	  life	  and	  conduct’	  (Bublick,	  1999:	  1433).	  	  
4.3.4. Rape	  Scripts	  	  Particular	   kinds	   of	   beliefs	   form	   part	   of	   the	   cultural	   background	   for	   the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  rape	  myths	  and	  attitudes	  toward	  acts	  of	  sexual	  violence.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  common	  examples	  of	  rape	  myths,	  based	  on	  a	  belief	  in	  sex	  role	  stereotypes,	   is	  articulated	  by	   the	  assertion	   that	  women	   lie	  about	   rape.	  This	   assertion	   tends	   to	   underpin	   many	   articulations	   of	   rape	   myths	   in	   which	  complainants	   are	   viewed	   as	   unreliable,	   blameworthy	   or	   outright	   lying	   (Reese,	  2013:	   459).	   This	   belief	  may	  be	   informed	  not	   only	   by	  Burt’s	   underlying	  beliefs,	  but	  also	  other	  specific	  features	  of	  the	  case.	  	  Other	  conditions	  included	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  rape	  incident	  by	  individuals	  include	   specific	   features	   of	   each	   alleged	   case.	   These	   specific	   features	   are	   the	  situational	   context,	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   complainant	   and	  accused	  and	  their	   interaction	   thereafter	   (Bell,	   Kuriloff	   &	   Lottes,	   1994;	   Bridges	   &	   McGrail,	  1989),	   the	   timeliness	   of	   the	   report	   of	   the	   alleged	   rape	   to	   police,	   and	   the	  complainant’s	   demeanour	   (Frohmann,	   1991:	   217-­‐221;	   LeGrand,	   1973:	   928;	  Temkin,	   1997:	   516).	   All	   these	   considerations	   together	   with	   the	   belief	   in	   rape	  myths	  make	  up	  rape	  scripts.	  Rape	  scripts	  are	  defined	  as	  ‘common	  sense’	  ways	  in	  which	   to	  understand	  rape	  or	  certain	  conceptualisations	  of	   the	  gender	  relations	  and	  of	  social	  life,	  such	  as	  the	  examples	  given	  above,	  that	  act	  as	  heuristic	  tools	  in	  the	   assessment	   of	   cases	   of	   rape	   (Littleton,	   2011:	   794;	   Anderson	   &	   Doherty,	  2008:9).	  A	   rape	   script,	   in	   a	   sense,	  helps	   individuals	   to	   identify	   ‘real’	   rape	   from	  legitimate	  rape,	  often	  using	  rigid	  stereotypes,	  thereby	  determining	  what	  can	  be	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defines	  as	  rape.	  Common	  rape	  scripts	  often	  categorise	  a	  prototypical	  rape	  as:	  an	  unplanned	   and	   rare	   ‘act	   of	   aggression	   between	   a	   stranger	   and	   physically	  resisting	   (and	   typically	   female)	   victim’	   (Hill,	   2014:	   472);	   that	   occurs	   in	   a	  situational	   context	  generally	  understood	  as	   risky	  or	  dangerous	   for	  women;	   the	  victim	   of	   this	   rape	   will	   report	   the	   rape	   to	   the	   police	   in	   a	   speedy	   manner	  (Westmarland	  &	  Graham,	  2010:	  95;	  Frohmann,	  1991:	  219;	  Hill,	  2014:	  473);	  the	  victim	  will	  display	   feelings	  of	  anger	  and	  show	  physical	  signs	  of	   trauma	  such	  as	  ‘stiffening	   of	   the	   body	   and	   tightening	   of	   the	   face…	   shaking	   of	   the	   body	   and	  crying…	  lowering	  of	  the	  voice	  and	  long	  pauses	  when	  the	  victim	  tells	  the	  specifics	  of	   the	   sexual	   assault	   incident’	   (Frohmann,	   1991:	   221).	   Any	   deviation	   from	   the	  rape	  script	  makes	  the	  circumstance	  more	  ambiguous	  for	  observers	  to	  assign	  full	  responsibility	  to	  perpetrators,	  leading	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  complainant	  as	  provocative,	  victim	  blaming,	  the	  minimisation	  of	  the	  event	  as	  less	  traumatic	  than	  in	   ‘typical’	  cases,	  and	  provision	  of	   justifications	  for	  the	  perpetrators	  acts	  (Frese	  et.	  al.,	  2004:	  143;	  Jewkes,	  1999:	  11).	  	  This	  social	  construction	  of	  rape,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  rape	  scripts	  is	  often	  informed	  by	  rape	  myths	  and	  creates	  what	  Krahe	  and	  Temkin	  (2008:	  209)	  call	  ‘the	  justice	  gap’.	  For	  Krahe	  and	  Temkin	  (2008)	  the	  justice	  gap	  operates	  ‘by	  reducing	  the	  range	  of	  what	  is	  considered	  a	  genuine	  rape	  complainant’.	  Within	  the	  justice	  gap,	  specific	  aspects	  of	   the	   rape	  are	  deemed	   to	  be	  questionable	  or	   inconsistent,	  making	   the	  allegation	   of	   rape	   one	   that	   is	   regarded	  with	   suspicion	   or	   disbelief.	   These	   rigid	  and	   restrictive	   aspects	   that	   necessitate	   bias	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   decision-­‐maker	  affect	   judgments	   of	   guilt,	   blame	   and	   the	   perceptions	   of	   the	   victim’s	   credibility.	  Every	   aspect	   of	   the	   rape	   is	   scrutinised	   and	   deemed	   questionable	   when	  determining	  whether	  a	  rape	  is	  socially	  judged	  as	  genuine,	  looking	  at	  how	  victims	  should	  appear,	  behave	  and	  testify	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  consistent,	  cooperative	  and	  sincere	   even	   when	   these	   social	   indicators	   for	   genuine	   raped	   are	   untested	  empirically	  (Frohmann,	  1991:	  213-­‐214).	  	  	  4.4. The	  Real	  Picture	  of	  Rape	  in	  South	  Africa	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Although	  rape	  statistics	  are	  not	  completely	  reliable	   in	  South	  Africa,	  a	  variety	  of	  studies	   illustrate	   the	  nature	  of	   rape	   in	   certain	  parts	   of	   South	  Africa,	   as	  well	   as	  how	   rape	   is	   dealt	   with	   in	   the	   justice	   system	   (Vetten	   et.	   al.,	   2008;	   Jewkes	   &	  Abrahams,	   2002;	   Swart	   et.	   al.,	   1999).	   These	   studies	   corroborate	   each	   other,	  suggesting	  that	   the	  nature	  of	  rape	   in	  South	  Africa	   is	  often	  not	  prototypical.	  For	  the	  following	  discussion	  I	  refer	  to	  a	  2008	  study	  conducted	  by	  Vetten	  et.	  al.	  which	  tracked	  all	  cases	  of	  rape	  reported	  to	  the	  police	  in	  Gauteng	  in	  2003.	  Simply	  stated	  ‘men	  who	  rape	  commonly	  rape	  multiple	  women	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  and	  have	  difference	  types	  of	  victims’	  (Jewkes	  et.	  al.,	  2010:	  30;	  Jewkes,	  Sikweyiya,	  Morrell	  &	  Dunkle,	  2009).	  Unlike	  the	  prototypical	  rape	  between	  an	  unsuspecting	  victim	  and	  stranger,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  rape	  perpetrator	  and	  victim	  ranged	  from	  rape	  by	  a	  stranger	  or	  an	  acquaintance	  to	  rape	  by	  an	  intimate	  partner	  (Vetten	  et.	  al.,	   2008:	   34).	   Unlike	   the	   prototypical	   rape,	   the	   location	   of	   the	   rape	   is	   not	  commonly	   a	   remote	   and	   dark	   area.	   Instead,	   it	   is	   shown	   that	   the	  mostly	   likely	  place	   for	   the	   rape	   to	   take	  place	   is	   the	  perpetrator’s	  home.	  Vetten	  et.	   al.	   (2008:	  35)	   state	   that	   ’31,7%’	   of	   rapes	   occur	   at	   the	   perpetrator’s	   home,	   followed	   by	  ’20,4%’	   occurring	   in	   open	   spaces	   and	   ’20,3%’	   occurring	   at	   the	   victim’s	   home.	  Furthermore,	  rather	  than	  women	  being	  raped	  in	  deserted	  and	  remote	  areas,	  it	  is	  found	  the	  in	  ’25,6%’	  of	  all	  rapes	  there	  are	  other	  individuals	  (non-­‐participants)	  on	  the	  same	  premises.	  Various	  forms	  of	  resistance	  are	  recorded.	  Mostly	  commonly	  used	  forms	  of	  resistance	  include	  physical	  resistance,	  verbal	  resistance	  and	  non-­‐verbal	  resistance,	  with	  one	  out	  of	  four	  rape	  victims	  attempting	  one	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  resistance	  (Vetten,	  2008:	  37).	  Verbal	  resistance	   included	  saying	  no	  and	  non-­‐verbal	   resistance	   included	  actions	   such	  as	   ‘crying	  or	   turning	   their	  heads	  away’	  (Vetten	  et.	  al.,	  2008:	  37).	  The	  actions	  of	  rape	  victims	  after	  the	  incident	  also	  varied	  greatly.	  Actions	  after	  the	  rape	  incident	  ranged	  from	  falling	  asleep	  or	  remaining	  at	  the	   scene	   of	   the	   incident	   to	   fleeing	   the	   scene	   and	   getting	   help	   immediately.	  Unlike	   popular	   belief	   in	   rape	   victims	   washing	   soon	   after	   the	   rape,	   it	   was	  recorded	  that	  one	  in	  twenty	  rape	  victims	  did	  wash	  soon	  after	  the	  rape	  (Vetten	  et.	  al.,	  2008:	  40).	  After	  the	   incident,	   the	  timeliness	  of	  reporting	  the	  rape	  covered	  a	  large	  range.	   ‘Over	  half	  of	  rapes	  were	  reported	  within	  hours	  of	  their	  occurrence,	  with	   three-­‐quarters	  of	  victims	  reporting	   to	   the	  police	  within	  a	  day	  of	   the	   rape.	  The	  longest	  any	  victim	  waited	  before	  reporting	  to	  the	  police	  was	  5	  years’	  (Vetten	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et.	  al.,	  2008:	  39).	  A	  long	  delay	  in	  reporting	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  highly	  publicised	  story	   of	   rape	   allegation	   against	   Bob	   Hewitt,	   a	   South	   African	   tennis	   legend.	  Somewhat	  of	  an	  extreme	  example,	  Bob	  Hewitt	  was	  charged	  in	  a	  civil	  case	  ‘almost	  40	  years	  after	  the	  alleged	  incident’	  (Wagiet,	  2014).	  Medical	  assessments	  after	  the	  incident	  show	  that	  genital	  signs	  of	  injury	  and	  injuries	  to	  the	  body	  are	  not	  always	  present	  in	  all	  cases	  of	  rape,	  especially	  in	  cases	  where	  adults	  are	  raped.	  In	  fact,	  a	  high	   proportion	   of	   rape	   presented	   ‘no	   injuries	   to	   either	   the	   genitals	   or	   other	  parts	   of	   the	   body’	   (Vetten	   et.	   al.,	   2008:	   40).	   	   The	   reality	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   any	  forms	  of	  injury	  in	  cases	  of	  sexual	  assault	  has	  previously	  been	  argued	  in	  a	  study	  by	  Du	  Mont	  and	  White	  (2007:	  27-­‐28),	  who	  argue	  that	  empirical	  studies	  proving	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  presence	  of	  injury	  sustained	  by	  the	  victim	  and	  a	  positive	  legal	  outcome	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  large	  number	  of	  rapes	  that	  do	  not	   result	   in	   injury.	  This	  persistence	  of	   the	   interrogation	  of	   ‘the	  victim’s	  moral	  character	   and	   conduct,	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   victim	   and	   defendant,	   the	  incident,	  and	  the	  victim-­‐defendant	  relationship’	  (LaFree,	  1980:	  835)	  by	  means	  of	  referral	  to	  rape	  scripts	  and	  rape	  myths	  may	  be	  reflective	  of	  a	  general	  belief	  in	  the	  just	  world	  theory,	  as	  posited	  by	  Melvin	  Lerner	  (1965).	  	  4.5. Rape	  Supportive	  Culture:	  The	  Law	  and	  Rape	  Myths	  	  Lerner’s	   (1965)	   study	   shows	   that	   when	   individuals	   try	   to	   make	   sense	   of	  experiences,	   their	   evaluation	  of	   events	   shows	  a	  belief	   in	   the	   just	  world	   theory.	  The	  just	  world	  theory	  states	  that	  ‘people	  are	  inclined	  to	  believe	  in	  a	  just	  world	  -­‐	  a	  place	  where	  individuals	  get	  what	  they	  deserve	  and	  deserve	  what	  they	  get’	  (Jones	  &	   Aronson,	   1973:	   415).	   Therefore,	   people	   will	   often	   find	   more	   comfort	   in	  understanding	  events	  and	  consequences	  are	  somehow	  just,	  deserved	  or	  earned.	  These	   rape	   scripts	   explain	   rape	   victims	   as	   inviting,	   eliciting,	   or	   consenting	   to	  rape	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  behaviour,	  appearances	  and	  choices.	  Ultimately,	  although	  the	  accuser	  is	  subsequently	  ‘identified,	  vilified	  and	  even	  criminalised’	  (Anderson	  &	  Doherty,	  2008:	  3),	  the	  entire	  incident	  is	  assessed	  as	  just	  and	  normal.	  However,	  by	  normalising	  the	  alleged	  rapist’s	  actions	  or	  shifting	  the	  blame	  onto	  the	  accuser	  the	   severity	   of	   the	   rape	   is	  minimised	  or	   even	   eliminated,	   thus	   legitimating	   the	  rape	  act	  itself.	  This	  stems	  largely	  from	  a	  reluctance	  to	  accept	  the	  rape	  victims	  as	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completely	   blameless,	   along	   with	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   responsible,	   therefore	  blameworthy,	  victim.	  This	   is	  evidently	  articulated	   in	  the	  assertion	  that	   ‘a	  raped	  woman	  is	  a	  responsible	  victim	  not	  an	  innocent	  one’	  (Feild,	  1978:	  161).	  	  This	   has	   created	   a	   culture	   that	   is	   in	   support	   of	   rape,	   which	   allows	   the	  objectification	   and	   normalises,	   legitimises	   and	   enforces	   the	   violent	   abuse	   of	  women,	   but	   also	   participates	   in	   the	   victimisation	   of	  women	  who	   have	   already	  been	  victimised.	  For	  MacKinnon	  (1983),	  a	   rape-­‐supportive	  culture	   is	  culture	  of	  suspicion	   that	   begins	  with	   a	   society	   that	   does	   not	   explicitly	   prohibit	   rape,	   but	  regulates	  rape	  by	  various	  means	  such	  as	  accepting	  rape	  scripts	  and	  rape	  myths	  that	   condone	   and	   accept	   rape	  whilst	   supported	   by	   conception	   of	   the	   rapeable	  woman	  and	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  rape	  as	  sex.	  Society	  as	  a	  whole	  becomes	  an	  offender,	   participating	   in	   what	   Joyce	   Williams	   (1984)	   terms	   ‘secondary	  victimisation’.	   Individual	   and	   unsympathetic	   responses	   such	   as	   disbelief	   and	  blame,	   along	   with	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   all	   forms	   of	   support	   as	   a	   result,	   impact	  negatively	  on	  women	  making	  genuine	  accusations	  of	  rape	  causing	  further	  harm	  in	  the	  form	  of	  pain	  and	  trauma.	  Consequently,	  ‘women	  who	  charge	  rape	  say	  they	  were	   raped	   twice,	   the	   second	   time	   in	   court’	   (MacKinnon,	   1983:	   651).	   This	  statement	   can	   only	   be	   convincing	   if	   one	   recognises	   how	   pervasive	   a	   rape-­‐supportive	  culture	  is	  at	  every	  level	  of	  society.	  The	  law	  is	  a	  ‘social	  process’	  (Pether	  &	   Threadgold,	   2000:	   151).	   By	   accepting	   that	   the	   law	   does	   not	   remain	   exempt	  from	   social	   and	   cultural	   norms,	   especially	   in	   its	   practice,	   one	   can	   begin	   to	  understand	   how	   ‘socio-­‐cultural	   supports	   for	   rape’	   (Rozée	   &	   Koss,	   2011:	   296)	  permeate	  not	  only	  the	  fundamental	  structures	  and	  practices	  justice	  system,	  but	  also	  all	  social	  institutions.	  	  	  Describing	   the	   law	   as	   a	   rape-­‐supportive	   institution	   is	   most	   significant	   in	   its	  operation	  outside	  of	  law	  books.	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  cultures	  that	  support	  rape	  are	  most	   apparent	   in	   police	   stations,	   courtrooms	   and	   emergency	   rooms,	   where	  police,	   prosecutors,	   and	   judges	   are	   involved	   in	   decision-­‐making	   that	   often	  requires	   their	  own	   interpretation	  of	   the	   law	  and	  their	  own	  discretion	  (Van	  der	  Bijl	   &	   Rumney,	   2009:	   425;	   Kersetter,	   1990:	   283).	   This	   decision-­‐making	   is	  influenced	  by	  their	  own	  social	  attitudes,	  since	  these	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  citizens	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and	  social	  individuals	  first,	  influence	  by	  social	  attitudes	  and	  beliefs	  governed	  by	  	  ‘pervasive	   and	   enduring	   symbolic	   constructions	  pertaining	   to	  male	   and	   female	  sexuality	   and	   a	   normalised	   hierarchical	   binary	   constructed	   between	   the	   two	  sexes’	   (Du	  Toit,	  2012:	  465),	   stereotypes	  and	  myths.	   Social	   attitudes	  are	  deeply	  ingrained	   in	   legal	   staff	   and	   all	   professionals	   involved	   in	   rape	   cases.	   Outside	   of	  law	   books,	   decision-­‐makers	   employ	   the	   use	   of	   ‘extra-­‐legal	   devices’	   (Jones	   &	  Aronson,	   1973:	   415)	   to	   establish	   of	   who	   is	   deemed	   responsible,	   and	   to	   what	  degree	  the	  responsibility	  extends,	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  statute	  which	  dictates	  how	  each	   case	   should	  be	   assessed.	  Any	   individual	   that	   accepts	   a	   rape	  myth	  or	  rape	   script	  will	   therefore	   judge	   ‘the	   [rape	  victim]	  according	   to	   these	   cherished	  myths’	   (Feild,	  1978:	  176)	  or	  construct	   their	  character	   in	  a	  manner	  which	  plays	  on	  myths.	  Therefore,	  rape	  attitudes	  inevitably	  transcend	  into	  court	  cases	  and	  it	  is	  through	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  the	  law	  in	  practice,	  that	  the	  law	  has	  institutionalised	  patriarchal	   values	   and	   modes	   of	   socialisation	   (Feild,	   1978:	   173;	   Rozée,	   1993:	  499;	  Donat	  &	  D’Emilio,	  1992).	  	  ‘Almost	  two	  third	  of	  men	  believed	  that	  women	  are	  partly	  responsible	  for	  sexual	  assault’	  (CIETAfrica,	  2000:	  3).	  Similiarly,	  studies	  show	  that,	  especially	  in	  cases	  of	  sexual	  assault,	  victim-­‐blaming	  and	  the	  acceptance	  of	  rape	  myths	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  questioning	  of	  victims	  by	  advocates	  (Maier,	  2012)	  and	  the	  behaviour	  of	  medical	  professionals	   (Best,	   Dansky	   &	   Kilpatrick,	   1992;	   Berger,	   1977:	   23).	   The	  acceptance	  of	  certain	  gender	  biases	  in	  the	  form	  of	  rape	  myths	  by	  attorneys	  and	  judges	  as	  well	  as	  the	  influence	  of	  gender	  myths	  and	  	  (Martin,	  Reynolds	  &	  Keith,	  2002)	  gender-­‐specific	  stereotypes	  has	  also	  been	  shown	  (Van	  der	  Bijl	  &	  Rumney,	  2009;	   Feild,	   1978;	   Temkin,	   1997;	   Bindel,	   2007;	   Kersetter,	   1990).	   Studies	  focusing	  on	  the	  judiciary	  have	  shown	  acceptance	  of	  rape	  myths	  and	  rape	  scripts	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  showing	  how	  judges	  distinguish	  between	  genuine	  complainants	  and	  women	  asking	  for	  it	  (Bohmer,	  1974:	  304-­‐305).	  These	  characterisations	  and	  distinctions	  are	  influenced	  by	  considerations	  of	  the	  complainant’s	  character,	  the	  reporting	   of	   the	   rape	   and	   a	   reliance	   on	   rape	   myths.	   The	   conclusion	   is	   that	  professionals	  within	  the	  justice	  system	  do	  take	  into	  consideration	  more	  than	  just	  material	   evidence	   when	   making	   decisions	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innocence	  of	  the	  perpetrator	  in	  light	  of	  the	  victim’s	  perceived	  credibility	  (Eyssel,	  2009:	  589;	  Ellison	  &	  Munro,	  2009).	  	  	  The	   limits	   of	   law	   reform	  are	   substantiated	  by	   the	   aforementioned	   studies	   that	  show	  that	  gender	  equality	  within	  the	  justice	  system,	  especially	  in	  its	  enactment	  has	   not	   been	   achieved,	   even	   where	   the	   law	   determines	   it	   to	   be	   so.	   There	   is	  empirical	   evidence	   supporting	   this	   claim,	   showing	   how,	   in	   some	   cases,	   legal	  actors	  apply	  older	  standards	  to	  rape	  cases,	  even	  when	  there	  are	  new	  standards	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reform	  (Loh,	  1980).	  The	  limitation	  of	  rape	  law	  reform	  in	  changing	  ‘knowledge,	   values	   and	   attitudes	   about	   gender	   and	   sexuality’	   (Goldberg,	   1992:	  182),	   results	   in	   a	   justice	   gap	   along	   with	   a	   legal	   institution	   that	   subtly,	   but	  implicitly,	   supports	   rape.	   The	   pervasiveness	   of	   gender	   bias,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  acceptance	  and	  use	  of	  rape	  myths	  and	  fixed	  and	  stereotypical	  rape	  scripts,	  within	  the	  law	  undermines	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  justice	  system,	  especially	  the	  objective	  to	  allow	  all	  individuals	  fair	  trials	  and	  the	  upholding	  of	  equality	  within	  rape	  trials.	  The	  Jacob	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  serves	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  determine	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  claim	   that	   rape	   is	   a	   criminal	   offence	   which	   is	   the	   most	   ‘intimately	   related	   to	  broader	   social	   attitudes	   and	   evaluations	   of	   the	   victim’s	   conduct’	   (Krahe	   &	  Temkin,	  2008:	  33)	  holds	  true.	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5. The	  Jacob	  Zuma	  Rape	  Trial	  	  On	   6	   December	   2005,	   rape	   charges	   were	   brought	   against	   Jacob	   Zuma.	   The	  complainant	  known	  by	  the	  pseudonym,	  Khwezi,	  is	  the	  daughter	  of	  Jacob	  Zuma’s	  now	   deceased	   friend	   and	   comrade	   in	   the	   African	   National	   Congress.	   It	   was	  alleged,	  by	  Khwezi,	  that	  on	  2	  November,	  whilst	  staying	  at	  the	  accused’s	  home	  in	  a	  guest	  room,	  he	  had	  sexual	  intercourse	  with	  her	  without	  her	  consent.	  Zuma	  pled	  not	  guilty.	  On	  8	  May	  2006,	   the	  presiding	   judge	   found	  that	   ‘consensual	  sex	   took	  place’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  171)	  and	  Zuma	  was	   found	  not	  guilty.	  Khwezi’s	  account	  (Graham,	  2013:	  30)	  of	   the	  rape	   incident	  was	   that	  she	  was	   invited	   to	  spend	   the	  night	   at	   the	   Zuma	   residence.	   After	   falling	   asleep	   in	   the	   guest	   room	   she	   was	  awoken	  by	  Zuma,	  who	  was	  naked	  and	  offering	  a	  massage.	  She	  verbally	  declined	  the	   massage	   twice	   but	   Zuma	   proceeded	   to	   massage	   then	   rape	   her.	   Khwezi	  alleged	  that	  she	  ‘froze	  during	  the	  process’,	  closing	  her	  eyes	  and	  turning	  her	  head	  sideways’	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	   2006:	   17).	   In	   a	   state	   of	   shock,	   Khwezi	   said	   she	   left	   the	  residence	   the	  next	  day	   to	  go	   to	  work.	  Zuma’s	  account	  of	   the	   incident	  was	   that:	  Khwezi	   visited	   and	   decided	   to	   stay	   overnight	   on	   her	   own	   accord;	   she	   was	  allocated	   the	   guest	   room;	   she	   had	   gone	   to	   Zuma’s	   room	   during	   the	   evening	  where	  the	  incident	  took	  place;	  she	  did	  not	  verbally	  refuse	  sex,	  thereby	  rendering	  the	  sex	  consensual	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  17;	  Graham,	  2013:	  30).	  	  Within	  the	  trial,	  cross-­‐examinations	  of	  the	  complainant,	  the	  accused,	  experts	  and	  witnesses	   were	   cross-­‐questioned	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   the	   most	   probable	  events	   of	   2	   November.	   I	   examine	   the	   way	   in	   which	   cross-­‐examination	  surrounding	   the	   different	   accounts	   took	   place,	   specifically	   looking	   at	   the	  characteristics	   of	   the	   case	   that	  were	   highlighted	   and	   ignored	   by	   the	   state	   and	  defence	  attorney.	  I	  also	  focus	  on	  how	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  incident	  was	  argued	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  constructed	  the	  complainant	  and	  the	  accused	  in	  particular	  ways.	  My	   findings	   are	   represented	   alongside	   examples	   from	   the	   media	   coverage	  surrounding	   the	   case.	   This	   is	   significant	   in	   understanding	   the	   social	   context	   in	  which	  the	  trial	  occurred	  as	  well	  as	  the	  public	  discourse	  that	  surrounded	  the	  trial.	  Since	   the	   media	   also	   produces	   and	   reproduces	   meaning	   through	   discourse,	   it	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also	  provides	  its	  own	  interpretations	  of	  the	  case	  in	  varied	  and	  particular	  ways	  by	  providing	  a	  platform	  where	  ‘political,	  personal	  or	  group	  agendas	  and	  comments’	  (Robins,	   2008:	   415)	   can	   be	   articulated.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   see	   how	  ‘some	   pressure	   groups,	   organisation	   and	   individuals	   found	   the	   accused	   guilty	  and	  others	  found	  him	  not	  guilty	  in	  their	  comments	  on	  the	  case’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  3)	   through	   the	  media,	   and	  how	   this	   construction	   is	   similar	  or	  dissimilar	   to	   the	  construction	  of	  the	  accused	  and	  complainant	  in	  the	  trial	  by	  the	  defence,	  the	  state	  and	  the	  Judge.	  	  	  	  5.1. Introducing	  Khwezi,	  the	  Deviant	  Provocateur	  	  	  In	  the	  judgement	  Khwezi	  is	  introduced	  as	  a	   ’31	  year	  old	  female,	  unmarried	  and	  with	  no	  biological	  children’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  7),	  although	  she	  identifies	  herself	  as	  a	  lesbian,	  the	  Judge	  describes	  her	  as	  ‘not	  an	  out	  and	  out	  lesbian’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  21).	  Zuma	  was	  never	  introduced	  in	  this	  manner,	  nor	  was	  any	  reference	  to	  his	  age	  or	  domestic	  life	  made,	  except	  when	  his	  age	  and	  weight	  were	  mentioned	  relating	  to	   the	   possibility	   for	   resistance	   to	   the	   alleged	   rape.	   Highlighting	   information	  about	  Khwezi’s	  age,	  sex,	  marital	  status,	  sexuality	  and	  domestic	  life	  provides	  the	  audience	  with	  details	  that	  can	  inform	  perceptions	  of	  Khwezi	  in	  particular	  ways.	  For	  example,	  given	  the	  information	  provided	  about	  Khwezi,	  an	  underlying	  belief	  in	   sex	   role	   stereotyping	  may	   result	   in	   constructing	  Khwezi	   as	   the	   provocative,	  deviant	  female.	  Any	  individual	  that	  holds	  a	  belief	  in	  sex	  role	  stereotyping	  cannot	  accept	   a	   female	   aged	   31,	   who	   appears	   to	   reject	   social	   norms	   and	   have	   no	  aspirations	   for	   motherhood	   or	   marriage.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   Khwezi	   is	   a	  deviant	  who	  rejects	  normative	  social	  roles	  of	  women.	  Khwezi’s	  choices	  regarding	  the	   roles	   she	   assumes	   are	   unacceptable,	   cannot	   be	   socially	   respectable,	   and	  provoke	   condemnation	   and	   punitive	   or	   corrective	   reactions	   and	   attitudes.	  	  Furthermore,	   even	   though	   Khwezi	   identifies	   herself	   as	   a	   lesbian,	   the	   Judge	  describes	   her	   as	   a	   bisexual	   woman,	   who	   identifies	   herself	   as	   lesbian.	   This	  construction	  of	  Khwezi’s	  sexuality	  by	   the	   Judge	  provides	  an	  example	  regarding	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Khwezi	  is	  constructed	  given	  the	  information	  presented.	  Within	  a	   heteronormative	   paradigm,	   which	   is	   constitutive	   in	   a	   belief	   in	   sexual	   role	  stereotyping,	   Khwezi’s	   homosexuality	   or	   bisexuality	   is	   understood	   as	   either	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confused,	   and	   therefore	   in	   need	   of	   clarification	   through	   correcting,	   or	   simply	  unnatural,	   suggesting	   that	   there	   is	   something	   fundamentally	   wrong	   with	   her.	  This	   view	   could	   be	   articulated	   in	   the	   assertion	   that	   ‘there	   is	   something	  wrong	  with	  a	  woman	  who	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  marry	  and	  raise	  a	  family’	  (Burt,	  1980:	  222).	  Her	  sexuality	  would	  therefore	  elicit	  the	  same	  reactions	  her	  status	  as	  unmarried	  without	   children	   does.	   Therefore,	   an	   alleged	   act	   of	   rape	   in	   light	   of	   this	  interpretation	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  misunderstanding	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  accused,	  or	  an	  act	  of	  correction.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  said	  that	  the	  Judge	  illustrated	  a	  fundamental	  belief	   in	  sex	  role	  stereotyping	  when	  analysing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  he	  defined	  her	  sexuality.	   Defining	   her	   sexuality	   as	   anything	   other	   than	   how	  Khwezi	   identifies	  herself	   suggests	   a	   level	   of	   disbelief	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   she	   did	   so.	   Therefore	  according	   the	   Judge’s	   interpretation,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   Khwezi	   described	   her	  sexuality	   was	   not	   ‘normal’	   and	   needed	   further	   clarification	   or	   correction.	   His	  insistence	   on	   Khwezi’s	   bisexuality	   may	   be	   informed	   by	   her	   past	   relationships	  and	   sexual	   history,	   in	  which	   she	   engaged	   in	   sexual	   intercourse	  with	  men.	  This	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   later	   in	   this	   section.	   In	   contrast,	   this	   line	   of	  interrogation	  was	  not	  addressed	  in	  relation	  to	  Zuma	  whose	  domestic	  life,	  such	  as	  his	   practice	   of	   polygamy,	   was	   in	   no	   way	   presented	   in	   the	   judgement,	   most	  probably	  because	  it	  was	  understood	  to	  be	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  case	  at	  hand	  (Reddy	  &	   Potgieter,	   2009:	   515).	   This	   imbalance	   in	   the	   presentation	   of	   information	  relating	  to	  the	  two	  parties	  involved	  displays	  a	  bias	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  character	  of	  the	  complainant	  and	  the	  accused,	  whereby	  the	  complainant	  was	  regarded	  with	  a	  more	  critical	  eye	  than	  the	  accused	  was.	  	  	  Sex	  role	  stereotyping	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  Khwezi	  as	  the	  sexually	  provocative	   woman,	   with	   various	   camps	   suggesting	   various	   reasons	   for	   her	  provocation.	   Much	   of	   the	   public	   discourse	   politicised	   the	   complainant’s	  allegation	  claiming	  that	  Khwezi’s	  allegations	  were	  part	  of	  a	  political	  conspiracy	  to	   damage	   the	   reputation	   of	   Zuma,	   whilst	   others	   argued	   that	   she	   brought	  allegations	  of	  rape	  for	  financial	  gain	  or	  as	  an	  act	  of	  punishment	  (Waetjen	  &	  Maré,	  2009:	  63,	   76).	  The	  media	   reported	  Zuma	   supporters	  holding	  posters	   that	   read	  ‘How	  much	  did	  they	  pay	  you,	  bitch?’	  (Evans	  &	  Wolmarans,	  2006).	  According	  to	  Zuma’s	  evidence,	  Khwezi	  gave	  ‘indications’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  107)	  that	  suggested	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she	  wanted	  to	  engage	  in	  sexual	  intercourse.	  	  None	  if	  these	  indications	  included	  a	  direct	   expression	   of	   her	   intent,	   on	   her	   account.	   This	   argument,	   presented	   by	  Zuma,	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   belief	   of	   sex	   role	   stereotypes	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  femininity	   is	   constructed	  as	   requiring	   a	   level	   of	   sexually	   timidity.	  Therefore,	   ‘a	  woman	  shouldn’t	  give	   in	  sexually	   to	  a	  man	   too	  easily	  or	  he’ll	   think	  she’s	   loose’	  (Burt,	  1980:	  222).	  Instead	  a	  woman	  is	  expected,	  in	  this	  perspective	  to	  be	  merely	  suggestive	  by	  giving	  indications.	  According	  to	  Zuma	  these	  indications	  came	  from	  an	  number	  of	  intimations:	  text	  messages	  message	  ‘ending	  with	  words	  like	  ‘hugs’	  or	  ‘love’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  59);	  ‘the	  way	  she	  sat	  and	  what	  was	  discussed	  between	  them’	   (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  109);	  engaging	   in	   ‘sexually	  charged	  conversations’	   (S	  v	  Zuma,	   2006:	   160);	   the	   fact	   the	   wore	   a	   kanga	   (a	   sarong-­‐like	   wrap)	   with	   no	  underwear	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	   2006:	   15-­‐16);	   and	   her	   invitation	   of,	   and	   enactment	   of	  what	  he	  perceived	  as	  sexual	  advances.	  The	  Judge	  made	  reference	  to	  these	  sexual	  invitations	  even	  though	  Khwezi	  stated	  that	  she	  ‘did	  nothing	  to	  make	  him	  believe	  that	  [she	  wanted	  to	  engage	  in	  sexual	  intercourse]’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  21).	  	  	  The	  description	  of	  Khwezi’s	  actions	  does	  two	  contradictory	  things	  here.	  First,	  it	  describes	   Khwezi	   as	   behaving	   in	   a	   way	   that	   conforms	   to	   the	   stereotypes	   of	  female	   sexual	   timidity,	  which	   suggests	   a	   desire	   for	   sexual	   intercourse	  without	  any	  clear	  expression	  of	  such	  a	  desire.	  By	  accepting	  Zuma’s	  line	  of	  argumentation,	  one	  accepts	   that	  actions	   interpreted	  as	  sexually	  charged	  or	  expressing	  a	  desire	  for	   sexual	   intercourse	  can	  be	  equated	   to	   some	   form	  of	   consent.	  Therefore,	   this	  belief	   in	   sex	   role	   stereotypes	  would	   presuppose	   an	   argument	   that	   if	   a	  woman	  wearing	  a	  revealing	  outfit	   invites	  a	  man	  into	  her	  home	  and	  takes	  off	  her	  shoes,	  and	  a	  man	  subsequently	  interprets	  these	  as	  indications	  of	  the	  woman’s	  desire	  to	  have	   sexual	   intercourse,	   if	   sexual	   intercourse	   does	   occur,	   the	   indications	   are	  assumed	  to	   imply	  consent.	   In	  this	   interpretation,	   the	  evidence	   is	   thus	  sufficient	  to	  assess	  that	  a	  rape	  did	  not	  occur	  (Schultz	  &	  DeSavage,	  1975:	  83).	  This	   line	  of	  argumentation	   is	   clearly	   problematic	   within	   the	   legal	   framework	   and	   in	   the	  public	  domain.	  In	  the	  public	  domain,	  making	  a	  link	  between	  ‘dress	  and	  sexuality	  is	  not	  new’	  (Nadar,	  2009:	  95).	  Popular	  arguments	  state	  that	  respectable	  women	  dress	  modestly,	  and	  that	  a	  woman	  wearing	  revealing	  clothes	  is	  a	  provocation	  of	  rape,	  which	  is	  a	  normal	  and	  justifiable	  reaction	  from	  men	  (Nadar,	  2009:	  95-­‐96).	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Many	   researchers,	   activists	   and	   organisations	   have	   campaigned	   and	   argued	  against	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  showing	  how	  it	  is	  based	  not	  only	  on	  stereotypes,	  but	  on	  the	  discrimination	  and	  policing	  of	  women,	  reasserting	  how	  no	  woman	  asks	  to	  be	  rape.	  One	  example	  of	  such	  a	  campaign	  involved	  a	  protest	  march	  by	  ‘hundreds	  of	   South	   African	   women…	   to	   a	   commuter	   taxi	   rank	   dressed	   in	   miniskirts	   to	  protest	  against	  the	  harassment	  for	  wearing	  miniskirts’	  (Tamale,	  2013:	  31;	  Lowe-­‐Morna,	   2008).	   	   A	   rape	   counsellor	   argues,	   ‘people	   still	   say	   that	   if	   you	   wear	   a	  miniskirt,	   you’re	   looking	   for	   it.	   But	   we	   know	   in	   this	   country	   that	   they	   rape	  women	   of	   86	   years	   and	   young	   six-­‐week-­‐old	   babies’	   (September,	   2014).	   In	   the	  legal	   framework,	  assumptions	  of	  consent	  do	  not	  amount	   to	  consent.	  Therefore,	  suggestions	  are	  not	  considered	  consent	  in	  law.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  description	  of	  Khwezi’s	  actions	  also	  describes	  her	  as	  behaving	  in	  a	   manner	   that	   is	   assumed	   to	   indicate	   sexual	   provocation	   and	   deviance	   in	   a	  deliberate	   and	   vindictive	   manner.	   The	   issue	   of	   sexual	   provocation	   was	   one,	  which	   was	   evident	   in	   media	   reports	   that	   documented	   much	   of	   the	   public	  discourse	   surrounding	   the	   trial.	   Zuma	   supporters	   were	   reported	   as	   holding	  photographs	   of	   Khwezi	   with	   the	   words	   ‘burn	   this	   bitch’	   written	   on	   them	  (Waetjen	  &	  Maré,	  2009:	  65).	  Many	  supporters	  of	  Zuma	  understood	  the	  allegation	  of	  rape	  as	  part	  of	  a	  political	  conspiracy,	  thus	  to	  be	  regarded	  with	  great	  mistrust.	  However,	   the	   conspiracy	   was	   not	   regarded	   in	   a	   purely	   political	   manner	   that	  required	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  conspirators,	  instead	  Zuma	  supporters	  understood	  the	  conspiracy	   as	   synonymous	   with	   the	   female	   accuser.	   It	   was	   the	   accuser,	   a	  naturally	   seductive,	   vindictive	   and	   exploitative	   woman,	   using	   her	   sexuality	   in	  order	  to	  work	  against	  Zuma	  by	  manipulating	  the	  justice	  system	  to	  get	  what	  she	  wanted	  (Waetjen	  &	  Maré,	  2009:	  73-­‐74,	  77).	  The	  accuser	  is	  thus	  to	  blame	  because	  she	  is	  the	  one	  with	  criminal	  intent.	  The	  determination	  of	  Khwezi’s	  guilt	  by	  Zuma	  supporters	  saw	  objects	  being	  thrown	  at	  her,	  pictures	  of	  her	  face	  being	  burnt,	  as	  well	  as	  labelling	  her	  a	  prostitute,	  troublemaker	  and	  criminal,	  all	  forms	  of	  public	  justice	  and	  punishment	  (Hassim,	  2009:	  5;	  Reddy	  &	  Potgieter,	  2009:	  516,	  518).	  	  	  Therefore,	   the	   Judge’s	   explicit	  mentioning	  of	   details	   relating	   to	  Khwezi’s	   social	  status	   as	   well	   as	   Zuma’s	   argument	   that	   her	   behaviour	   was	   suggestive	   and	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insinuated	   a	   desire	   for	   sexual	   intercourse	   are	   reliant	   upon	   a	   belief	   in	   and	  adherence	   to	   sex	   role	   stereotypes.	   Both	   instances	   characterise	  Khwezi	   as	   both	  provocative	   in	   her	   appearance	   and	   behaviour	   and	   deviant	   with	   regard	   to	   her	  marital	   status.	   By	   making	   choices	   that	   are	   interpreted	   as	   provoking	   or	  welcoming	  sexual	  intercourse,	  Khwezi	  is	  to	  blame	  in	  some	  form,	  or	  must	  at	  least	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  whatever	  would	  occurred.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  reason	  behind	  the	   way	   in	   which	   Zuma	   interpreted	   events	   as	   sexually	   charged	   is	   taken	   for	  granted	   and	   not	   interrogated.	   How	   Zuma	   regards	   indications,	   as	   a	   form	   of	  consent,	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  that	  was	  further	  examined	  within	  the	  trial	  –	  not	  even	  by	  the	  prosecution.	  	  	  	  Following	  the	  introduction	  of	  Khwezi,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  events	  unfolded	  prior	  to	  and	   after	   the	   alleged	   incident	  were	   addressed	   in	   the	   trial.	   Because	   the	   events	  were	   contested,	   specific	   elements	   came	   under	   the	   spotlight,	   with	   the	   Judge	  finally	  understanding	  the	  events	  that	  took	  place	  in	  favour	  of	  one	  narrative	  over	  the	   other.	   Specific	   areas	   of	   interest,	   as	   reflected	   in	   the	   judgement,	   included	  resistance	  and	  injury,	  the	  location	  of	  the	  incident,	  the	  presence	  of	  others	  on	  the	  premises,	  post-­‐rape	  events	  and	  the	  complainant’s	  previous	  sexual	  history.	  These	  aspects	  are	  discussed	  below,	  specifically	  illustrating	  adherence	  to	  rape	  scripts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Zuma	  (as	  revealed	  in	  his	  argument	  and	  his	  account	  of	  events)	  and	  the	  Judge.	  	  	  5.2. Rape	  Scripts:	  Anomalies	  	  The	   aspects	   of	   the	   unfolding	   of	   the	   events	   –	   from	   Khwezi’s	   arrival	   at	   Zuma’s	  home,	   her	   ‘intimate’	   messages,	   her	   staying	   over,	   visiting	   Zuma	   in	   his	   study	  scantily	  clad,	  wrapped	  in	  a	  kanga,	  then	  going	  to	  bed	  and	  being	  awoken	  by	  Zuma	  naked,	  are	  areas	  of	  the	  case	  that	  were	  central	  to	  the	  final	  judgement	  of	  the	  case.	  The	  unfolding	  of	  events	  that	  led	  to	  the	  incident	  can	  be	  evaluated	  as	  being	  taken	  as	   central	   or	   significant	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   facts	   within	   the	   trial.	   An	  analysis	  of	  how	  certain	  features	  were	  identified	  and	  interrogated,	  whilst	  features	  thought	   not	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   verdict	   were	   ignored,	   makes	   this	   possible.	  Analysing	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   these	   feature	  were	   accounted	   for	   and	   dealt	  with	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indicate	  a	   clear	  adherence	   to	   rape	  myths	  and	  rape	  scripts	  by	   the	   Judge	  and	  by	  Zuma.	   The	   acceptance	   of	   rape	  myths	   and	   rape	   scripts,	   along	  with	   information	  that	   does	   not	   support	   the	   rigid	   normative	   ideas	   and	   conceptions	   of	   what	   a	  legitimate	   rape	   would	   look	   like,	   accounts	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   doubt	   and	  blame	   accorded	   to	   the	   complainant	   in	   the	   alleged	   rape.	   In	   turn,	   the	   need	   to	  interrogate	  the	  complainant	  further	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  anomalies	   in	  the	  minds	   of	   the	   audience	   appears	   necessary.	   I	   also	   suggest	   that,	   although	   the	  decision	   to	   allow	   the	   use	   of	   the	   complainant’s	   sexual	   history	   became	   another	  feature	   deemed	   significant	   to	   the	   trial,	   it	   was	   informed	   by	   a	   prior	   suspicion	  regarding	   the	   complainant’s	   account	   of	   the	   alleged	   rape	   thereby	   requiring	   a	  thorough	  interrogation	  of	  the	  complainant’s	  credibility	  and	  reliability.	  The	  myth	  of	   the	   ‘suspect	  witness’,	   a	   convention	   in	   rape	   trials	   that	   has	   been	  discarded	   in	  South	  African	  law	  in	  the	  1980s,	  was	  thus	  resuscitated	  by	  the	  Judge	  in	  the	  Zuma	  trial.	  	  
5.2.1. Resistance	  and	  Injury	  	  Judge	   van	   der	   Merwe	   described	   the	   features	   of	   resistance	   and	   injury	   in	   the	  alleged	  incident	  as	  ‘very	  strange	  and	  odd	  features’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  160).	  One	  of	  these	   odd	   features	  was	   the	   that	   fact	   that	   the	   complainant’s	   age	   and	  weight	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  age	  and	  weight	  of	  the	  accused	  indicated	  that	  ‘the	  complainant	  was	  at	  least	  a	  reasonably	  fair	  match	  physically	  for	  the	  accused’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  160).	  Zuma	   initially	  presented	   this	   view	   in	  his	  plea,	   arguing	   that	   ‘she	   could’ve	   easily	  resisted’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  45).	  Additionally,	  the	  Judge	  cited	  that	  ‘the	  complainant	  is	  not	  in	  any	  way	  threatened	  or	  physically	  injured,	  her	  clothes	  are	  not	  damaged	  in	   any	  manner,	   at	   no	   stage	   did	   the	   accused	   resort	   to	   physical	   violence	   or	   any	  threat’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  160)	  as	  another	  strange	  feature	  of	  the	  case.	  According	  to	  the	  medical	   expert	  who	  examined	  Khwezi	   after	   the	   alleged	   rape	  was	   reported,	  she	   presented	   with	   	   ‘no	   physical	   injuries	   [and]	   a	   small	   fresh	   tear’	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	  2006:	  68),	  which	  conclusively	  indicated	  sexual	  activity	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  69)	  	  	  The	  lack	  of	  physical	  or	  verbal	  resistance	  by	  the	  complainant	  is	  described	  as	  odd	  and	  strange	  by	  the	  Judge,	  suggesting	  that	  Khwezi’s	  supposed	  incapacity	  was	  not	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a	   normal	   response	   to	   rape,	   even	   though	   she	   described	   how	   she	   had	   frozen	   in	  response	   to	   the	   alleged	   rape.	   Zuma’s	   insistence	   that	   she	   could	   have	   resisted	  suggested	   that	   if	   the	   alleged	   incident	   were	   rape,	   then	   Khwezi	   would	   have	  resisted.	   The	   belief	   in	   a	   rape	   victim’s	   ability	   to	   actively	   resist	   during	   a	  prototypical	  rape	  is	  illustrated	  here.	  Therefore,	  because	  Khwezi	  did	  not	  respond	  in	  the	  ‘normal’	  manner	  that	  rape	  victims	  would,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  claims	  that	  do	  not	   mimic	   conceptions	   of	   real	   rape	   need	   to	   be	   interrogated	   to	   establish	  legitimacy	  (Nadar,	  2009:	  97;	  Robins,	  2008:	  423).	  This	  view	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  broad	   range	   of	   responses	   to	   rape,	   one	   that	   includes	   the	   response	   that	   Khwezi	  alleged	  -­‐	  being	  unable	  to	  move.	  Similarly,	  the	  lack	  of	  injury,	  as	  presented	  by	  the	  expert	   witness	   fails	   to	   address	   research	   that	   presents	   cases	   of	   alleged	   rape	  where	  no	  injury,	  both	  bodily	  and	  genital,	  is	  found.	  	  	  
5.2.2. Location:	  Implying	  a	  Willingness	  to	  Have	  Sex	  	  The	   issue	   of	   the	   place	   where	   the	   incident	   happened	   was	   contested	   by	   the	  account	   of	   the	   complainant	   and	   the	   accused.	   In	   Zuma’s	   initial	   statement,	   he	  reported	   that	   the	   incident	   took	  place	   in	   the	  guest	  bedroom	  where	  Khwezi	  was	  sleeping	  (Graham,	  2013:	  30).	  He	  later	  claimed	  that	  the	  incident	  took	  place	  in	  his	  bedroom.	   Khwezi	   consistently	   maintained	   that	   the	   incident	   happened	   in	   the	  guest	   bedroom	   where	   she	   had	   been	   sleeping.	   Neither	   the	   defence	   nor	   the	  prosecution	   interrogated	   the	   inconsistency	   in	   Zuma’s	   claim	   regarding	   the	  location	  of	  the	  incident.	  	  	  In	  his	  commentary	  on	  the	  location	  of	  the	  alleged	  incident,	  the	  Judge	  said	  that	  ‘it	  is	  true	   that	   the	  accused’s	  case	  sounds	  a	  better	  one	  when	  he	  said	   the	  complainant	  came	  to	  his	  bedroom…	  if	  it	  took	  place	  in	  the	  main	  bedroom	  she	  must	  have	  gone	  there	  and	  it	  would	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  prove	  rape’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  110,	  155).	  Here,	  the	  Judge	  clearly	  illustrates	  adherence	  to	  rape	  myths	  and	  rape	  scripts.	  By	  concluding	   that	   it	  would	  be	  more	  difficult	   for	   the	   complainant	   to	  prove	   rape	   if	  she	  had	  gone	  to	   the	  accused’s	  room,	   the	   Judge	  suggests	   that	  wilfully	  entering	  a	  man’s	  bedroom	  signals	   a	  welcoming	  of,	   consenting	   to	  or	  provocation	  of	   sexual	  intercourse.	   This	   assumption	   coupled	   with	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	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between	  Zuma	  and	  Khwezi	  as	  ‘family	  friends’	  seems	  to	  indicate	  a	  belief	  in	  sexual	  conservatism,	  which	  would	  state	  that	  a	  rape	  is	  unlikely	  between	  individuals	  that	  are	  well	  acquainted.	  This	  view	  would	  suggest	   that	  as	  an	  acquaintance	  of	  Zuma,	  Khwezi	   implied	   a	   willingness	   to	   have	   sex	   when	   she	   entered	   his	   bedroom.	  Another	   issue	   considered	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   location	   of	   the	   incident	   was	   the	  presence	   of	   Zuma’s	   daughter	   and	   a	   policeman	   on	   the	   premises.	   The	   Judge	  described	   the	   allegation	   of	   rape	   under	   these	   circumstances	   as	   a	   ‘very	   odd	  feature’	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	   2006:	   160)	   since	   the	   complainant	   could	   have	   reacted	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   would	   have	   alerted	   people	   on	   the	   premises,	   adding	   that	   a	   rapist	  would	  be	   foolish	   to	  rape	  a	  sleeping	  women	  knowing	   the	  presence	  of	  others	  on	  the	   premises.	   However,	   research	   into	   rape	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   majority	   of	  incidents	  occur	  in	  domestic	  situations	  by	  people	  well-­‐known	  to	  victims.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  alleged	  rape	  did,	  in	  fact,	  occur	  in	  the	  home	  of	  the	  accused,	  with	  people	  on	  the	  premises	  it	  would	  not	  be	  an	  anomaly.	  Therefore,	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  incident	  occurred	   between	   compliant	   acquaintances,	   in	   the	   accused’s	   bedroom,	   with	  people	  present	  on	  the	  premise,	  portrays	  not	  only	  consent,	  but	  also	  suggests	  that	  no	   real	   harm	   could	   have	   occurred	   in	   circumstances	  where	   the	   complainant	   in	  effect	  had	  no	  constraints	  placed	  on	  her	  agency.	  	  	  
5.2.3. Post-­‐Rape	  Events	  	  The	  complainant	  and	  the	  accused	  agreed	  about	  the	  events	  that	  occurred	  after	  the	  incident.	   In	   both	   accounts,	   Zuma	   entered	   the	   guest	   room	   and	   engaged	   in	   a	  conversation	  regarding	  the	  complainant’s	  plans	  for	  the	  next	  day.	  Khwezi	  stayed	  in	   the	   guestroom	   until	   the	   next	  morning,	   bathed,	   packed	   a	   lunch	   and	  went	   to	  work	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  19).	  She	  did	  not	  report	  the	  alleged	  rape	  to	  the	  police,	  nor	  did	  she	   inform	  anyone	  of	   the	  alleged	  rape	  until	   the	  next	  day.	  She	   filed	  a	  report	  with	  the	  police	  on	  4	  November	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  17).	  According	  to	  Zuma,	  Khwezi	  had	  been	  free	  to	  leave	  the	  house	  and	  had	  access	  to	  her	  phone	  and	  the	  residential	  phone.	  According	  to	  Khwezi,	  her	  actions	  following	  the	  alleged	  rape	  were	  a	  result	  of	   shock.	   On	   the	   Judge’s	   reading	   of	   these	   arguments,	   he	   concluded	   that	   ‘the	  discussion	  that	   took	  place	   in	   the	  guest	  room…	  is	  not	   in	   line	  with	  rape	   that	  had	  just	   taken	   place’	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	   2006:	   158).	   In	   addition,	   a	   forensic	   psychologist	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argued	  that	  ‘victims	  of	  rape	  normally	  wash	  themselves	  as	  soon	  as	  possible’	  even	  though	  evidence	  shows	  this	  is	  not	  the	  typical	  behaviour	  of	  rape	  victims.	  	  	  Here,	  aspects	  of	  the	  rape	  such	  as	  interactions	  between	  the	  complainant	  and	  the	  accused,	  the	  complainant’s	  behaviour	  after	  the	  incident,	  and	  the	  timeliness	  of	  the	  reporting	   of	   the	   rape	   do	   not	   conform	   to	   prototypical	   rape	   scripts.	   Despite	  evidence	   showing	   the	   diversity	   of	   victim’s	   responses	   after	   a	   rape	   incident,	  socially	   constructed	   notions	   tend	   to	   interpret	   specific	   responses	   after	   a	   rape	  incident	  as	  representing	  a	  legitimate	  rape.	  When	  a	  rape	  victim	  reports	  a	  rape	  as	  soon	   as	   she	   possibly	   can,	   it	   makes	   sense	   since	   it	   is	   prescribed	   as	   a	   typical	  reaction.	  If	  instead,	  she	  does	  not	  act	  in	  a	  typical	  way,	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  ask	  why	  she	  does	  so,	  requiring	   further	  questioning	   in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  really	  happened.	  	  	  
5.2.4. Previous	  Sexual	  History	  	  Allowing	   testimony	   regarding	   the	   complainant’s	   sexual	   history	   was	   a	  contentious	  issue	  within	  the	  trial.	  Indeed,	  the	  Judge	  dedicated	  a	  large	  section	  of	  his	  judgement	  to	  his	  deliberations	  regarding	  this	  matter.	  According	  to	  the	  Judge,	  allowing	   evidence	   regarding	   the	   complainant’s	   past	   sexual	   history	   extending	  beyond	  the	  case	  at	  hand	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  potential	  relevance	  of	  the	  evidence	  provided.	   Relevance	   here	   is	   described	   as	   ‘based	   on	   a	   blend	   of	   logic	   and	  experience	  lying	  outside	  the	  law’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  25).	  Basing	  the	  assessment	  of	  relevance	   on	   experience	   indicates	   the	   use	   of	   extra-­‐legal	   devices	   in	   the	  determination	   of	   legal	   matters	   in	   this	   case.	   A	   door	   was	   then	   opened	   for	   the	  articulation	  of	  personal	  biases	  in	  judicial	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  defence	  attorney,	  Mr.	  Kemp,	  presented	   the	  argument	   that	   the	  complainant’s	   credibility	  could	  not	  ‘be	   properly	   tested	  without	   going	   into	   [the	   complainant’s]	   sexual	   history’	   (S	   v	  Zuma,	   2006:	   26).	   This	   argument	   was	   accepted	   by	   the	   Judge,	   suggesting	   that	  evidence	  presented	  in	  the	  court	  regarding	  the	  complainant’s	  sexual	  history	  was	  relevant	   to	   the	  credibility	  and	  reliability	  of	   the	  complainant’s	  allegations	  about	  the	  case	  at	  hand.	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Although	  the	  Judge	  allowed	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  complainant’s	  sexual	  history	  to	   be	   examined	   within	   the	   trial,	   he	   clearly	   stated	   that	   ‘it	   was	   not	   aimed	   at	  showing	   that	   the	   complainant	  was	  woman	   of	   questionable	  morals’	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	  2006:	  37).	  However,	  he	  added	  that	  ensuring	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  complainant	  in	   a	   manner	   that	   characterised	   her	   as	   immoral	   needed	   to	   be	   balanced	   with	  ensuring	  legal	  proceedings	  occurred	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  would	  result	  in	  an	  accurate	  and	  fair	  verdict.	  For	  the	  Judge,	  this	  necessitated	  ‘a	  degree	  of	  embarrassment	  and	  perhaps	   psychological	   trauma’	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	   2006:	   37),	   a	   harsh	   but	   acceptable	  reality.	  Moloi	   (2006:	  27,	   29)	   argues	   that	   this	   decision	  was	  not	   in	   line	  with	   the	  Constitution,	  since	  it	  infringed	  on	  the	  right	  to	  human	  dignity,	  and	  the	  explanation	  given	   by	   the	   Judge	   did	   not	   clearly	   explain	   interpretations	   of	   the	   law	   in	   this	  regard.	  In	  other	  words,	  allowing	  the	  complainant’s	  sexual	  history	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  trial,	  and	  consequently	  putting	  the	  complainant	  on	  trial,	  was	  a	  necessary	  evil	   in	   the	   light	  of	   the	   seriousness	  of	   the	  allegations	   (Graham,	  2013:	  29;	  Tamale,	  2013:	  20).	  	  In	   this	   part	   of	   the	   trial	   previous	   allegations	   of	   rape	  made	   by	   the	   complainant	  were	  presented,	  with	  every	  witness	   testifying	   that	   the	  allegations	  were	  grossly	  inaccurate	   and	   false.	   This	   indicated	   to	   the	   Judge	   how	   Khwezi	   had	   made	  numerous	  allegations	  of	  rape	  that	  had	  never	  been	  heard	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law	  or	  were	  rebutted	   by	   various	   witnesses.	   The	   Judge	   concluded	   that	   Khwezi	   illustrated	   a	  ‘proclivity	   to	   level	   false	  allegations	  of	  a	  distinctive	  and	  similar	  kind’	   (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  148)	  and	  that,	  along	  with	  her	  lack	  of	  credibility	  and	  reliability	  in	  previous	  cases,	  meant	  the	  state	  could	  not	  prove	  beyond	  reasonable	  that	  Zuma	  had	  raped	  Khwezi.	  	  5.3. Cultural	  Accounts	  of	  Rape	  	  The	  role	  that	  cultural	  justifications	  regarding	  the	  incident	  played	  within	  the	  trial	  arose	   from	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘Zuluness’	   that	   Zuma	   repeatedly	   alluded	   to.	   In	  particular,	  his	  argument	  that	  ‘in	  the	  Zulu	  culture	  you	  do	  not	  just	  leave	  a	  woman	  in	   that	   situation	   because	   she	   may	   even	   have	   you	   arrested	   and	   say	   you	   are	   a	  rapist’	   (Graham,	   2013:	   31)	   suggested	   that	   the	   reason	   he	   had	   responded	   to	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Khwezi’s	  ‘indications’	  in	  the	  way	  he	  did	  was	  because	  his	  culture	  required	  him	  to	  do	   so.	   By	   suggesting	   that	   culture	   required	   that	   he	   could	   not	   leave	   a	   woman	  aroused,	   Zuma	   essentially	   diverted	   responsibility	   away	   from	   himself.	   More	  significant	  to	  this	  study,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Judge	  accepted	  this	  justification.	  Although	  culturally	  loaded,	  he	  accepted	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  accused	  and	  the	  defendant	   in	   their	   respective	   gender	   roles.	   Suggesting	   that	   a	   seemingly	   hyper	  sexual,	  aroused	  woman	  requires	  sexual	  satisfaction	  otherwise	  she	  will	  retaliate	  in	  some	  form	  of	  the	  other,	  alludes	  to	  the	  vindictive	  and	  manipulative	  woman,	  an	  example	  that	  illustrated	  under	  adversarial	  sexual	  beliefs.	  	  	  The	   Judge	   seems	   to	   accept	   this	   cultural	   justification.	   This	   is	   evident	   in	   his	  conclusion	  where	  he	  references	  Rudyard	  Kipling’s	  poem	  ‘If’:	  ‘Had	   Rudyard	   Kipling	   known	   of	   this	   case	   at	   the	   time	   he	   wrote	   “If”	   he	  might	   have	   added	   the	   following:	   And	   if	   you	   can	   control	   your	   body	   and	  your	  sexual	  urges,	  then	  you	  are	  a	  man	  my	  son’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  174).	  This	  reference	  suggests	  that	  Zuma	  behaved	  in	  a	  boy-­‐like	  manner	  in	  his	  failure	  to	  control	  his	  sexual	  desires.	  However,	  despite	   failing	  to	  control	  his	  sexuality,	   ‘the	  Judge	  is	  going	  to	  let	  him	  off	  with	  a	  warning’	  (Graham,	  2013:	  31).	  Here,	  the	  Judge	  displays	   a	   belief	   in	   sex	   role	   stereotyping	   and	  makes	   an	   appeal	   to	   defeasibility.	  Zuma	  is	  accepted	  as	   failing	  to	  control	  his	  sexual	  desires	  because	  he	  personifies	  typical	  male	  virility	  (Robins,	  2008:	  422).	  Therefore,	  when	  provoked	  by	  a	  woman	  he	  acts	  in	  accordance	  to	  his	  innate	  nature	  and	  acts	  out	  his	  sexual	  desire.	  This	  in	  turn	  renders	  him	  blameless	  for	  his	  actions	  since	  the	  action	  was	  not	  a	  result	  of	  his	  own	  agency.	  	  	  Catherine	   Albertyn	   (2009)	   critically	   addressed	   the	   notion	   of	   culture	   as	   a	  justification	  for	  the	  choices	  made	  by	  individuals	  as	  presented	  by	  Zuma	  within	  the	  trial.	  According	  to	  Albertyn,	  notions	  of	  culture	  and	  tradition	  replicate	  patriarchal	  norms.	  This	  is	  problematic	  in	  the	  sense	  that,	  when	  expressing	  cultural	  practices	  as	  justification	  for	  any	  act,	  especially	  practices	  that	  are	  based	  on	  specific	  notions	  of	   masculinity	   and	   femininity,	   it	   goes	   against	   other	   rights	   such	   as	   equality	  (Albertyn,	  2009:	  168).	  The	  balancing	  of	  rights	  is	  thus	  required.	  Albertyn	  (2009:	  175)	  suggests	  that	  balancing	  rights	  such	  as	  culture	  and	  equality	  can	  be	  informed	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by	  the	  conception	  of	  culture	  as	  ‘contested	  and	  dynamic,	  as	  cultural	  values,	  norms	  and	  practice	  can	  be	  challenged,	  subverted	  and	  amended	  over	  time’.	  Therefore,	  in	  doing	   so,	   one	   can	   assess	   whether	   cultural	   practices	   are	   truly	   accepted	   by	   all	  members	  of	  a	  given	  grouping,	  and	  whether	  these	  contestations	  arise	  out	  of	   the	  value	   of	   ‘equality’	   trumping	   that	   of	   the	   right	   to	   practice	   culture	   and	   tradition.	  Therefore,	   simply	   accepting	   Zuma’s	   cultural	   justification	   for	   his	   actions	   is	  questionable	  and	  requires	  further	  interrogation	  that	  was	  not	  taken	  up	  within	  the	  trial.	  	  	  5.4. The	  Significance	  of	  Silence:	  Questioning	  Zuma	  	  Various	  instances	  in	  the	  trial	  illustrated	  how	  the	  complainant	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  cross-­‐examination.	  The	  character	  and	  credibility	  of	  Zuma	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  subject	  to	  cross-­‐examination	  and	  did	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  trial.	   For	   example,	   information	   regarding	   the	   Zuma’s	   domestic	   life	   was	   not	  presented,	   as	   shown	   before,	   nor	   were	   his	   inconsistencies	   with	   regards	   to	   the	  location	   of	   the	   incident	   subject	   to	   interrogation.	   Furthermore,	   determining	  pertinent	  facts	  relating	  to	  his	  sexual	  history,	  such	  as	  whether	  he	  had	  previously	  been	  accused	  of	  rape	  were	  not	  addressed	  in	  this	  trial.	  In	  discourse	  analyses,	  both	  what	  is	  said	  and	  what	  is	  unsaid	  is	  of	  significance	  because:	  ‘Domination	   inheres	   in	   communicative	   silences	   from	   a	   speech-­‐act	  perspective,	   because	   the	   contents	   of	   discourse	   also	   articulate	   the	  substance	   of	   gendered,	   cultural	   and	   politicised	   meanings’	   (Reddy	   &	  Potgieter,	  2009:	  512).	  Therefore,	   spaces	   of	   silence	   are	   meaningful.	   The	   lack	   of	   cross-­‐examination	   of	  Zuma	  suggests	  that	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  credibility	  and	  reliability	  of	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  rape	  trial	  allowed	  for	  a	  skewed	  determination,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  complainant	  rather	  than	  the	  accused.	  Therefore,	  the	  accused,	  rather	  than	  the	  complainant	  was	  privileged,	  with	  the	  burden	  on	  proof	  falling	  on	  the	  complainant,	  who	  was	  represented	  by	  the	  state.	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5.5. Zuma,	  the	  Victim	  of	  a	  Honey	  Trap	  	  ‘A	   judicial	   approach	   cannot	   be	   anything	   else	   than	   impartial,	   objective,	   fair	   and	  totally	   dedicated	   to	   the	   task	   lying	   ahead’	   (S	   v	   Zuma,	   2006:	   1).	   This	   statement,	  made	   by	   the	   Judge	   stands	   in	   direct	   contradiction	  with	   some	   of	   the	   arguments	  that	   he	   allowed	   and	   accepted.	   By	   allowing	   and	   accepting	   arguments	   and	  justifications	  by	  the	  defence	  that	  made	  use	  of	  and	  articulated	  rape	  myths	  or	  the	  acceptance	  of	  rape	  scripts,	  the	  Judge	  fundamentally	  allowed	  false	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  gender	  biases,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   rape	  myths,	   to	   shape	   the	   trial	   discourse	   in	   a	  specific	  way.	  The	  Judge	  exhibited	  a	  lack	  of	  reflexivity	  and	  uncritical	  acceptance	  of	  ‘gender	  stereotypes	  about	  rape	  victims	  and	  Zuma’s	  version	  of	   ‘traditional’	  Zulu	  masculinity’	  	  (Robins,	  2008:	  423)	  in	  his	  judgement.	  	  	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  in	  Khwezi	  is	  constructed	  through	  discourse	  regarding	  her	   domestic	   life,	   her	   responses	   to	   the	   incident	   and	   her	   sexual	   history	   as	   a	  deviant,	  whose	  narrative	  did	  not	  conform	  to	  often	  false	  social	  understandings	  of	  legitimate	  rape	  scenarios.	  The	  fact	  that	  evidence	  and	  testimony	  by	  witnesses,	  the	  accused	   and	   experts,	   some	   which	   was	   empirically	   disproven,	   was	   ultimately	  accepted	  by	   the	   Judge,	   illustrates	   an	  adherence	   to	   rape	  myths	   such	  as	   sex	   role	  stereotyping,	  adversarial	  sexual	  beliefs	  and	  sexual	  conservatism.	  This	  resulted	  in	  an	   account	   of	   the	   alleged	   rape	   that	   switched	   the	   identities	   of	   the	   complainant	  and	  the	  accused	  by	  means	  of	  excuses	  and	  justifications	  such	  as	  scapegoating	  and	  appeals	   to	   defeasibility.	   Thus,	   the	   complainant	   was	   constructed	   in	   a	   manner,	  which	  minimised	  the	  accused’s	  responsibility,	  minimised	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  a	   victim,	   and	   saw	   the	   complainant	   as	   responsible	   for	   the	   incident.	   The	  complainant	   became	   the	   subject	   of	   cross-­‐examination	   and	   scrutiny.	   As	   Suarez	  and	   Gadalla	   argue,	   this	   means	   that	   the	   circumstances	   of	   the	   personal	  responsibility	   of	   the	   defendant	   are	   significantly	   minimised:	   so	   the	   enormous	  political	  and	  personal	  power	  of	  the	  defendant	  is	  never	  part	  of	  the	  debate,	  nor	  is	  his	   relationship	   as	   ‘father’	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   victim	   interrogated	   (Suarez	   &	  Gadalla,	   2010:	   2012).	   Thus,	   coupled	   with	   adherence	   to	   strict	   and	   rigid	   rape	  scripts,	   Khwezi’s	   narrative	   becomes	   one	   that	   should	   be	   assessed	   with	   great	  caution	  and	  suspicion.	  Khwezi’s	  character	  and	  narrative	   is	  put	  on	  trial	  and	   it	   is	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her	  innocence	  that	  must	  be	  made	  sense	  of	  and	  proven	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt.	  In	   other	   words,	   Khwezi’s	   ‘general	   immoral	   character’	   (Tamale,	   2013:	   19)	  ironically	  becomes	  a	  mitigating	  factor	  for	  the	  defendant	  within	  the	  rape	  trial.	  	  	  Still,	   the	   determinations	   and	   construction	   of	   Khwezi’s	   character	   as	   a	   ‘loose	  woman,	   evil	   bitch,	   and	   disgrace’	   (Bennett,	   2008:	   6)	   inescapably	   rely	   on	   an	  acceptance	   of	   rape	   myths	   and	   rape	   scripts.	   Members	   of	   the	   public,	   many	   in	  support	  of	  Zuma,	  judged	  Khwezi	  as	  a	  vindictive	  woman,	  with	  Julius	  Malema,	  the	  African	   National	   Congress	   (ANC)	   Youth	   League	   president	   describing	   Khwezi’s	  experience	  as	  a	  ‘nice	  time	  [because]	  those	  who	  had	  a	  nice	  time	  will	  wait	  until	  the	  sun	  comes	  out,	  request	  breakfast	  and	  ask	  for	  taxi	  money’	  (News24,	  2011).	  This	  statement	   alone	   makes	   allusions	   to	   female	   confusion	   and	   indecision,	  vindictiveness,	   allegations	   for	   financial	   gain	   and	   female	   sexual	   timidity.	   	   These	  judgements	  are	  not	  based	  in	  material	  evidence	  in	  the	  trial	  alone,	  but	  instead	  are	  related	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  particular	  events	  informed	  by	  subjective	  biases.	  	  	  Similiarly,	  the	  evidence	  presented	  led	  to	  the	  conclusion	  by	  the	  Judge	  that	  ‘she	  is	  a	  strong	  person	  well	  in	  control	  of	  herself	  knowing	  what	  she	  wants.	  She	  is	  definitely	  not	  that	  meek,	  mild	  and	  submissive	  person	  she	  was	  made	  out	  to	  be’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	   174).	   As	   Lisa	   Vetten	   (2014)	   suggests,	   this	   narrative	   of	   Khwezi	   as	   a	  provocative	  party	   is	  determined	   to	  be	   the	   ‘master	  narrative’	  by	   the	   Judge.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  it	  represents	  reality,	   instead	  it	  means	  that	  the	  Judge	  determines	  this	  narrative	  to	  be	  the	  best	  way	  in	  which	  to	  understand	  the	  questioned	  events.	  Making	   sense	   of	   the	   incident	   and	   justifying	   the	   individual	   party’s	   actions	   by	  accepting	   Khwezi	   as	   a	   provocative	   and	   unchaste	   liar	   is	   accepted	   as	   the	   most	  reasonable	   way	   to	   understand	   the	   events	   of	   2	   November.	   Recently,	   former	  Constitutional	   Court	   judge,	   Zak	   Jacoob,	   recognised	   the	  way	   the	   Zuma	   trial	  was	  representative	  of	  a	   ‘story	   telling	  contest’	   (Narsee,	  2014)	  agreeing	  with	  Vetten’s	  understanding	   of	   Zuma’s	   narrative	   as	   the	   master	   narrative.	   He	   argued	   that	  instead	  of	  the	  trial	  focusing	  on	  determining	  the	  truth,	  the	  judgement	  in	  the	  trial	  reflected	  a	  decision	  based	  on	   ‘which	   side	   told	   the	  better	   story’	   (Narsee,	  2014).	  For	  Jacoob,	   this	  verdict	  revealed	  that	   ‘judges…	  were	  human	  and	  their	  decisions	  were	   to	   an	   extent	   subjective’	   (Narsee,	   2014).	   Therefore,	   acceptance	   of	   any	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particular	   narrative	   as	   a	   master	   narrative,	   for	   both	   the	   judge	   and	   the	   public,	  included	  subjectivity	  on	  a	  certain	  level.	  	  	  Rape	   myths	   are	   reflected	   in	   both	   the	   rape	   trial	   in	   social	   discourse,	   which	   is	  represented	  in	  the	  media	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  public.	  Intimidation,	  threatening	  and	  persecution	  of	  Khwezi	  by	  Zuma	  supporters	  (Ratele,	  2006:	  49;	  Kapp,	  2006)	  outside	   the	   court	   represents,	   in	   a	   stark	  manner,	   the	  way	   in	  which	  Khwezi	  was	  judged	  as	  a	  criminal	  perpetrator	  who	  was	  deserving	  of	  punishment.	  In	  the	  ‘good	  girl/bad	  girl’	  (Ramkissoon,	  2015)	  dichotomy,	  Khwezi	  fell	  under	  the	  bad	  girl	  label	  as	  an	  unmarried,	  childless,	  lesbian	  who	  dressed	  inappropriately	  in	  a	  man’s	  home.	  Therefore,	  she	  was	  considered	  mostly	  responsible	  for	  the	  incident	  that	  followed	  and	   allegations	   of	   rape	   made	   thereafter	   were	   for	   other	   reasons	   that	   did	   not	  include	  non-­‐consent.	  These	  sentiments	  were	  echoed	  within	  the	  trial	   itself,	  with	  the	   Judge	   asking	   the	   question,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   common	   and	   fundamental	  articulations	   of	   a	   rape	   myth:	   ‘a	   vital	   question	   is	   why	   would	   the	   complainant	  shout	  ‘rape	  when	  she	  was	  a	  willing	  participant	  in	  sexual	  intercourse?’	  (S	  v	  Zuma,	  2006:	  172).	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6. Conclusion	  	  The	  sheer	  magnitude	  of	  gender	  violence	  statistics	  suggests	  that	  oppressive	  and	  sexist	  norms,	  practices	  and	  stereotypes	  still	  persist	  in	  the	  South	  African	  society.	  Sexist	  norms	  and	  experiences	  of	  sexism	  persist	  despite	  the	  deinstitutionalisation	  of	   sexist	   norms	   and	   legal	   reform	   in	   relation	   to	   public	   and	  private	   life.	   	   Statute	  alone	  has	   failed	   to	   eliminate	   gender	  discrimination	  as	   illustrated	   in	   the	   lack	  of	  real	   change	   in	   the	   lived	   experiences	   of	   women	   in	   South	   Africa.	   This	   suggests	  more	   work	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   in	   the	   service	   of	   realising	   the	   society	   that	   is	  envisioned	   in	   the	  Constitution.	  Such	  an	  endeavour	  calls	   for	   the	  rooting	  out	  and	  the	   removal	   of	   all	   forms	   of	   gender	   injustices.	   We	   can	   begin	   rooting	   out	   such	  injustices	  within	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  law	  since	  legal	  institutions	  and	  frameworks	  evidently	  do	  not	  adequately	  address	  the	  social	  character	  and	  social	  permeations	  of	   sexist	   norms.	   It	   is	   the	   social	   permeations	   of	   sexist	   norms	   that	   can	   be	  understood	   as	   gaps	   and	   loopholes	   that	   hinder	   or	   diminish	   the	   achievement	   of	  institutional	  objectives.	  Rape	  myths	  and	  rape	  scripts	  reflect	  these	  norms.	  	  Feminist	  theorists	  have	  highlighted	  gender	  bias,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  adherence	  of	  rape	  myths,	  within	  rape	  trials	  as	  an	  area	  that	  exhibits	  a	  gap	  or	  a	  loophole	  in	  the	  justice	   system.	   Rape	   myths	   are	   conceptualised	   as	   problematic	   social	  constructions	  and	  notions	  of	  rape	   that	   inform	  perceptions	  of	  rape	   in	  ways	   that	  can	   lead	   to	   harmful	   and	   detrimental	   perceptions	   of	   the	   victim.	   This	   occurs	   by	  making	  sense	  of	  a	  rape	  incident,	  relying	  on	  underlying	  beliefs	  in	  rape	  myths	  to	  do	  so.	   Consequently,	   one	   interprets	   events	   of	   a	   rape	   incident	   in	   ways	   that	   place	  blame	   on	   the	   victim,	   reduce	   the	   experience	   of	   vulnerability	   and	   victimisation,	  and	   reduce	   the	   perpetrators	   responsibility.	   This	   process	   largely	   occurs	  unconsciously	  and	  permeates	  all	  levels	  of	  society.	  	  	  The	  empirical	  case	  study	  of	  the	  Zuma	  rape	  trial	  highlights	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  interface	  between	  the	  social	  forces	  of	  culture	  and	  gender	  construct	  discourse	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  perpetuates	  gender	  bias	  and	  gender	  discrimination.	  This	  is	  so	  even	  in	   the	  sphere	  of	   the	   law	  and	   the	   justice	  system,	  which	   is	  substantively	   fair	  and	  neutral.	   However,	   through	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   law,	   by	   legal	   professionals	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within	   a	   social	   context,	   it	   becomes	   evident	   that	   achieving	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	  Constitution,	  such	  as	  equality	  and	  dignity,	  cannot	  be	  the	  work	  of	  legal	  reform	  and	  feminist	  jurisprudence	  alone.	  Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  social	  constructions	  of	  gender	  in	  the	  form	  of	  rape	  myths,	  myths	  of	  the	  bad	  woman,	  the	  loose	  woman,	  the	  vamp,	  continue	  be	  perpetuated	  through	  social	  discourse	  and	  through	  socialisation,	  we	  are	  not	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  victims	  of	  rape,	  who	  are	  constructed	  within	   those	  oppositions	  of	  good/bad	  women,	  nor	  are	  we	  going	   to	  be	   able	   to	   substantially	   change	   the	  problematic	   characteristic	   of	   rape	   in	   South	  Africa,	   such	   as	   low	   conviction	   rates	   and	   underreporting.	   Instead,	   the	  representation	   of	   rape	   myths	   within	   rape	   trials	   will	   only	   serve	   to	   nurture	   a	  culture,	  which	  normalises	  and	  is	  supportive	  of	  the	  act	  of	  rape.	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